HKC and Basel: Two Conventions, One Ship, And a Shared Way Forward
A ship can arrive at a recycling yard with its certificates in order. That does not establish where its asbestos will end up, whether workers will breathe toxic dust, or whether contaminated water will reach neighbouring communities. For ship recycling, the distance between legal paperwork and actual protection is where the international debate must finally land.
The Hong Kong Convention (HKC), adopted in 2009, entered into force on 26 June 2025. Its relationship with the 1989 Basel Convention remains unsettled. Shipowners and regulators need an answer: how can recycling satisfy both instruments without duplicating administration or weakening protection? The stakes are substantial. UNCTAD’s Review of Maritime Transport 2025 records approximately 6.34 million gross tons sold for recycling in 2024. Bangladesh accounted for 43.2%, India 33.9%, Pakistan 7.2% and Türkiye 7.4%. Together, they represented 91.7% of the market. Recycling supplies valuable steel and employment; asbestos, heavy metals and residual oils carry risks for workers, communities and ecosystems. Uncertainty concentrated in these countries affects shipping worldwide.
An argument that has outlived its usefulness
Basel and the HKC approach overlapping activities differently. A ship destined for dismantling may constitute waste while remaining an operational vessel. Where Basel applies, transboundary movement attracts notification, consent and environmentally sound management obligations. The HKC regulates ships, hazardous-material inventories, recycling plans, authorized facilities, inspections and certification. Compliance with either instrument does not automatically satisfy the other.
Attempts at reconciliation have accumulated. Basel’s Open-ended Working Group developed equivalence criteria in May 2010, but COP-10 in Cartagena reached no consensus in 2011. IMO’s Marine Environment Protection Committee, meeting from 30 September to 4 October 2024, approved provisional guidance, HKSRC.2/Circ.1, while acknowledging unresolved legal questions. Basel COP-17, held from 28 April to 9 May 2025, adopted Decision BC-17/23, welcoming the HKC’s entry into force and inviting comments on that guidance. Subsequent working-group cooperation with IMO includes comments on coordination and legal clarity due by 30 October 2026.
After years of discussion, another institutional assertion of regulatory superiority will settle little. Depending on its legal effect, such an assertion could itself raise questions under international law. We need an agreed method of testing what protection actually occurs.
Define protection, then measure it
Basel Article 2(8) defines environmentally sound management (ESM) through taking all practicable steps to protect human health and the environment against adverse effects from hazardous and other wastes. That provides common legal ground, but leaves practical questions: what protection is adequate, what evidence proves it, and how should practicability account for unequal resources?
An HKC authorization cannot settle concerns about waste handling or downstream disposal. Equally, independently verified improvements in a developing country deserve recognition even where infrastructure differs from that of wealthier states. Neither national assurances nor assumptions about geography establish performance. Universal protection must remain the starting point. Countries differ in technology, labour conditions, treatment infrastructure, finance and enforcement capacity. These differences affect the cost, sequence and feasibility of improvements; they cannot excuse unacceptable exposure or pollution. Insisting on immediately identical infrastructure may make implementation economically impossible. Leaving protection entirely to national discretion invites weaker safeguards.
I propose a joint assessment framework developed by IMO and the Basel Secretariat with the International Labour Organization, recycling states, independent legal and scientific experts, and relevant stakeholders. It should distinguish mandatory environmental and occupational outcomes from additional improvements whose means and timetable can reflect national circumstances.
Three connected assessments are needed. Environmental indicators should cover hazardous-waste containment, soil and water contamination, air emissions, asbestos, downstream treatment and monitoring.
Occupational and social indicators should cover exposure, accidents, fatalities, protective equipment, medical surveillance, training, emergency preparedness and community effects.
Economic and institutional assessment should examine technology costs, treatment availability, enforcement, financing and the consequences of alternative compliance pathways.
Transparent empirical research should inform their relative importance. Protective thresholds must be established first. Economic and social analysis should then identify feasible ways to meet them and improve further. A single aggregate score would be dangerous: commercial efficiency cannot offset fatal accidents or serious pollution. Nor should equivalent protection require identical technology or expenditure everywhere. The framework must be reproducible, with common indicators, standardized monitoring, independent audits and public reporting. Inventories should connect each hazardous waste stream to records of collection, treatment, recovery and final disposal. Exposure measurements should be assessed against recognized occupational standards. Soil and water testing should reveal releases. Inspections should compare actual operations with approved plans. Certificates would become the beginning of scrutiny.
Start where the ships are
Bangladesh offers a practical pilot. Its market share and HKC accession make it an important testing ground, while its economic and technical circumstances require careful assessment. Representative yards should be studied by regulators, universities, independent laboratories, workers’ representatives, industry and international technical experts. The study should identify existing compliance, remaining gaps and resources needed to close them. Facilities meeting all applicable mandatory requirements should receive evidence-based recognition.
Deficiencies require corrective programs that separate immediate safety duties from infrastructure investments needing longer implementation. Independently monitored milestones may extend over several years, but continued operation must remain conditional on applicable legal requirements. A timetable cannot legalize present non-compliance. The purpose is demonstrable progress toward full compliance, without premature claims of achievement. Comparable studies in India, Pakistan and Türkiye would test the methodology across regulatory and economic settings.
For an owner deciding where to send a vessel, this would offer a clearer basis for due diligence. For regulators, it would connect approval to observable results across the entire waste chain. For workers and neighbouring residents, it would make public scrutiny possible. These are practical reasons to pursue agreement, even while governments continue negotiating the legal questions that science alone cannot resolve fully.
Keep both treaties legally intact
Shared ESM criteria could support assessments under both conventions and inform the unresolved debate over equivalent control and enforcement. They cannot settle every legal question.
Basel’s notification, prior informed consent and illegal-traffic provisions remain distinct obligations. Neither an HKC certificate nor an IMO guideline can displace them.
The solution therefore needs two parts: common evidence-based environmental and occupational assessment, alongside coordinated transboundary procedures. Competent authorities should exchange information and recognize documentation where legally permissible, removing unnecessary duplication while preserving every mandatory requirement.
Where existing provisions prevent harmonization, Parties should consider legally appropriate formal decisions, coordinated national measures or treaty amendments. Guidelines facilitate implementation; they cannot independently amend Basel or extinguish its obligations.
IMO, the Basel Secretariat and interested governments should establish a joint technical and legal mechanism with a defined research and consultation programme. It should build on both conventions’ guidance, earlier equivalence work and IMO’s SENSREC experience. Shared digital documentation deserves examination, provided national competent authorities retain their legal powers. Pilot findings should be published and independently reviewed by scientists and lawyers, supporting an internationally accepted methodology accessible to governments, owners, yards and civil society.
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Developing countries should neither claim compliance through good intentions nor face judgment by income or location. Universal safeguards can coexist with nationally appropriate implementation when evidence verifies protection and progress. Basel must retain its safeguards; the HKC must fulfil its specialized role. The industry needs both to work together. The test is what happens to the ship, its wastes and the people handling them after the paperwork is signed.
Dr. Ishtiaque Ahmed is a Professor and Chair of the Department of Law at North South University, Bangladesh. A former Merchant Marine Engineering Officer, he holds a Doctor of the Science of Law (J.S.D.) degree from the University of Maine School of Law, USA, where he specialized in International Ship recycling laws and policy. He contributed to the drafting of Bangladesh’s Ship Recycling Rule 2025 (proposed) and revising Bangladesh Ship Recycling Act 2018 as the sole Legal Consultant. Dr. Ahmed is also a qualified Barrister of England, an active member of Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (MCIArb) in London and an Advocate of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh. His expertise lies at the intersection of maritime law, environmental regulation, and sustainable ship recycling practices. He can be reached at [email protected].
The opinions expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of The Maritime Executive.
