Updated: A Hormuz War Summary for Mariners
The maritime community knows the Gulf well. But the current situation as it pertains to the Strait of Hormuz, the maritime focus of interest, is difficult to follow. The Iranian media, which is frequently quoted verbatim and uncritically by Western media, is tightly controlled and directed by the Iranian authorities, and used to put across a narrative supporting the IRGC line, much of which is at variance with the facts on the ground. By contrast, the Western media reflects diverse views, often from members of the same government; but these commentators do not always have an understanding of the sophisticated but opaque Iranian political system, which is very different from Western-style democracy.
After a week of little movement during which negotiations have faltered, a clear shift in US strategy has emerged in recent days which provides greater clarity on how the conflict is likely to progress in the following weeks. Much of this became clear in a briefing given to global oil and commodity CEOs in Washington on April 28 by US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent. Unfortunately, this strategy is unlikely to lead to a resumption of business as usual through the Strait of Hormuz any time soon.
Iranian Objectives: The Iranian clerical regime’s long-term strategic goal is a mix of religious and Persian nationalist objectives, aiming to establish Shi’a Iran as the dominant regional power in the Middle East. Iran sees itself as a global power, this is a long-term strategy, and the regime is patient. In the short-term, the regime seeks somehow to survive the current war – and then, post-recovery, to resume the march towards regional domination. The short-term survival goal is bolstered by the knowledge that regime collapse is likely to be fatal for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Israeli Objectives: The strategic aim of Israel is to secure its national survival. As far as Iran is concerned, this translates into changing the regime which espouses Iran’s expansionist strategy (see above), neutralizing the nuclear and ballistic missile threat, and ending Iranian support for hostile proxy forces which threaten Israel from neighboring countries. Defense Minister Israel Katz has made it clear recently that the Israeli future intention is “first and foremost to complete the elimination of the Khamenei dynasty”, if necessary employing a much broader military campaign than in the previous phase of the conflict, to include “destroying key energy and electricity facilities, and dismantling [Iran’s] national economic infrastructure.” Free access for mariners through the Strait of Hormuz is not fundamental to the Israeli master aim, but would likely be a byproduct of it.
US Strategy: American war aims have shifted and settled in recent days, re-baselined in light of the failure to move the Iranians in the negotiating process, and with the realization that the destruction of Iran’s military capability alone will not topple the regime. This shift puts more priority on Operation Economic Fury – using the naval blockade and sanctions to exert economic pressure on Iran, creating in time pressure on the regime within, as high prices, lack of utilities and shortages of basic essentials create internal unrest. It is acknowledged that this will take some time, but it is an effective way of exploiting American military dominance with little risk to US forces. This approach does not preclude further direct military action – which if it happened would focus on damaging infrastructure, acting as a catalyst and hastener for economic collapse. Such military action might be taken on the initiative of the United States and its allies – or it might be a response, prepared in advance, to an Iranian provocation.
The Situation Inside Iran: IRGC hardliners have consolidated their grip on power, and IRGC ruthlessness is effectively suppressing street political unrest and opposition. IRGC dominance is likely to mask substantial dissent within the ruling elite, with dissenters biding their time for the moment. The IRGC apparatus has historically been less effective in suppressing non-political “economic” protests – over shortages, lack of utilities, high prices and trade union disputes, none of which can be characterized by the IRGC as “anti-patriotic.” Contrary to the state media line that the country is united behind the regime, there is anecdotal evidence that while political protest has been suppressed, there is deep reservoir of hatred for the regime, and a willingness to undergo hardships if it means the regime can be taken down.
The Gulf States: With the Strait of Hormuz closed and the threat of a resumption of the war at any moment continuing, pressure is building up within the Gulf States. Most have made some attempt to reason with the Iranians through diplomatic channels – without evident success. The most dramatic impact has been on the United Arab Emirates, on the receiving end of five times more drone and missile attacks than Saudi Arabia, and whose economic model is severely compromised. The UAE has tended to be more robust and forward-leaning in its political judgements than its neighbors. Now that its air defenses have been reinforced with Israeli Iron Dome and Iron Beam laser air defense systems, the UAE may get to a point where it feels it can and needs to join in direct action to reopen the Strait.
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The Strait of Hormuz: The Iranians will be able to keep the Strait closed with minimal military capability: an armed speedboat, a suggestion that mines have been laid, and an occasional drone strike suffices to do the job. However, a slight increase in traffic through the Strait in the last month, with maritime security consultancy Windward reporting for example that 19 vessels made the transit through the waterway on April 25, suggests that Iran is bowing to pressure from states with whom it needs to stay friendly, if only for future business dealings. At the same time, the US blockade against Iranian ships and ports is becoming more effective, as techniques and tactics are developed, particularly exploiting the US Navy’s global reach. Oman, as a key stakeholder, is still pushing to maintain the current IMO-endorsed toll-free Traffic Separation Scheme, which is largely channeled through Omani territorial waters.
A Forecast: For President Trump, continuing the war over a longer timeframe, preferably with a ceasefire still in force, is probably the lesser political evil than declaring victory with the Strait still closed – which in any case might face so much opposition, both internally, from Asia and from the Gulf states, as to be unattainable. Alternately, the administration could adopt a low-risk military strategy, exploiting US military dominance without risking casualties, and reverting to the mantra that Iranian regime change can only come from within. The aim of the American campaign, now that the conventional Iranian military capability has largely been neutralized, is now seemingly to reinforce and exacerbate internal pressures on the regime, so as to bring about a genuine, not cosmetic, change in the character of the regime, such that ballistic missile and nuclear issues can thereafter be successfully negotiated. Such a strategy does not preclude the possibility of a devastating resumption of military operations – which the United States and its allies would want to concentrate over as short a time period as possible. The deployment of US forces suggests that it is preparing for such a strategy.
The opinions expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of The Maritime Executive.