Op-Ed: Bangladesh's Phased HKC Rollout Makes Sense - If Enforced

 

When the Hong Kong International Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships (HKC) entered into force on June 26, 2025, it changed the legal landscape of global ship recycling overnight. What had long been discussed as a future compliance goal suddenly became binding international law. Bangladesh, the world’s largest ship-recycling state by volume, immediately found itself under intense scrutiny. Critics were quick to argue that allowing ship-recycling yards to comply with the Convention “phase by phase” after the deadline risked violating one of the Convention’s most important rules: the obligation of no favorable treatment enshrined in article 3.4.

At first glance, the criticism seemed powerful. The Convention is clear that non-compliant facilities must not gain a commercial advantage over compliant ones. Allowing yards that are not yet fully compliant to continue operating after entry into force appears, on the surface, to give them exactly that advantage. For observers unfamiliar with the details of Bangladesh’s regulatory response, the conclusion seemed obvious: phased implementation equals unlawful favorable treatment.

That conclusion, however, does not survive close legal examination once Bangladesh’s newly drafted ship-recycling rules 2025 are properly understood. The real legal question has never been whether Bangladesh needs time to transition. International environmental law has long accepted that developing states may implement complex treaties progressively, provided they act in good faith and move steadily toward compliance. The more difficult question has been whether such flexibility can coexist with the HKC’s no-favorable-treatment obligation, which is designed to prevent cost-based competition through lower standards.

Bangladesh’s newly drafted Ship Recycling Rules 2025 (proposed) respond directly to that concern. They do not treat phased compliance as a blanket exemption. Instead, they convert transition into a tightly controlled legal status, surrounded by conditions, restrictions, and enforcement mechanisms that are meant to neutralize competitive advantage. Under the new draft rules, a non-compliant facility is not given a free pass named as Document of Authorization to Conduce Ship Recycling (DASR) to continue business as usual. It is allowed to operate only under the existing domestic legal framework, and only subject to “reasonable restrictions” imposed by the competent authority; Bangladesh Ship Recycling Board (BSRB). These restrictions are not symbolic. They are central to the design of the transition regime.

First, the transition period itself is strictly time-limited. A non-compliant facility may be allowed to operate for a maximum of two years on a phase-by-phase basis. There is no open-ended tolerance. The clock starts running immediately, and the destination is clear: full compliance with the HKC or exit from the market.

Second, permission is never granted in one block. Authorization is issued for a maximum of six months at a time. Each extension depends on continued regulatory oversight, demonstrated progress, and adherence to an agreed compliance roadmap. This converts the transition into a rolling compliance test rather than a blanket license to operate.

Third, and most importantly from the perspective of international law, non-compliant facilities must demonstrate alternative measures that are equivalent to the Convention’s requirements. This is a critical legal safeguard. The Convention itself allows for equivalence in implementation, provided the underlying level of environmental protection and worker safety is maintained. By requiring equivalence, Bangladesh removes the central feature of favorable treatment: lower compliance costs achieved by lower standards.

Fourth, the transition regime is backed by strict monitoring by the competent authority. Oversight is not discretionary in practice, even if the authority retains some discretion in how it evaluates progress. Facilities must submit plans, meet milestones, and accept inspections. If progress stalls or commitments are not met, authorization can be withdrawn.

Finally, the legal consequence of failure is explicit and severe. If a facility does not achieve full HKC compliance within the permitted transition period, its right to continue ship recycling is terminated. There is no entitlement to indefinite operation. In legal terms, uninterrupted ship recycling becomes a conditional privilege, not a vested right.

Taken together, these features fundamentally change the legal character of phased implementation. This is not favorable treatment. It is regulated exposure to compliance risk. The non-compliant facility operates under tighter scrutiny, shorter permissions, and the constant threat of closure or uninterrupted operation. A fully compliant yard, by contrast, enjoys regulatory stability, market credibility, and uninterrupted access to international obsolete tonnage. The competitive advantage, if any, flows toward compliance, not away from it. This distinction matters. The no-favorable-treatment obligation does not prohibit all forms of transition. It prohibits competitive distortion. Bangladesh’s recent draft rules are carefully designed to remove that distortion by ensuring that transitional facilities do not enjoy regulatory certainty, lower oversight, or reduced safety obligations compared to compliant ones.

Seen in this light, the allegation that Bangladesh is violating, or is on the verge of violating, the HKC is overstated. The country has not ignored the no-favorable-treatment rule; it has operationalized it through conditional authorization, equivalence requirements, and enforceable deadlines. This is precisely what good-faith implementation looks like in a complex industrial sector.

That said, the legal story does not end with drafting. International law judges a nation state not only by the quality of its rules, but by how it applies them. The strength of Bangladesh’s position depends entirely therefore on enforcement. If permissions are renewed mechanically, if oversight becomes symbolic, or if deadlines are quietly extended, the good-faith argument will weaken rapidly. At that point, critics would be justified in questioning whether transition has slipped into disguised exemption.

For this reason, the most important step now is immediate and visible enforcement. The government must operationalize the new rules without delay. Monitoring must be real, termination powers must be credible, and equivalence assessments must be rigorous. Any hesitation risks creating the perception that the rules exist mainly to deflect criticism rather than to discipline the market.

Bangladesh has done something few major ship-recycling states have managed: it has translated an abstract international obligation into a workable domestic compliance pathway that respects both development realities and treaty discipline. That achievement deserves recognition, not reflexive condemnation. But it also carries responsibility. Delay or selective enforcement would raise serious good-faith concerns and reopen the legal debate Bangladesh has worked hard to settle.

The HKC was never meant to demand instant perfection. It was meant to end a system where lower standards were rewarded. Bangladesh’s newly drafted rules show that transition and discipline can coexist. The task now is simple, though not easy: enforce them.

Dr. Ishtiaque Ahmed is a Professor and Chair of the Department of Law at North South University, Bangladesh. A former Merchant Marine Engineering Officer, he holds a J.S.D. (Doctor of the Science of Law) from the University of Maine School of Law, USA, where he specialized in International Ship recycling laws and policy. He contributed to the drafting of Bangladesh’s Ship Recycling Rule 2025 (proposed) and revising Bangladesh Ship Recycling Act 2018 as the sole Legal Consultant. Dr. Ahmed is also a qualified Barrister of England, an active member of Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (MCIArb) in London and an Advocate of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh. His expertise lies at the intersection of maritime law, environmental regulation, and sustainable ship recycling practices. He can be reached at [email protected].