Editorial: Risks of Houthi Attacks on Shipping Increase

The risk of a resumption of Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden has risen in recent days, linked to growing potential for the resumption of hostilities in Gaza.
On January 19, the Houthi leadership in Yemen announced that they would no longer attack US and UK shipping so long as a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas held. Since the Houthi announced that they would suspend their campaign, insurance premiums for Red Sea transits have fallen and there have been no announced attacks. The industry has regarded the ceasefire as fragile, and major carriers such as Maersk, Hapag-Lloyd, MSC and CMA CGM have been reluctant to resume services through the Red Sea. Some shipping has returned, however, including LNG tanker traffic, which normally carries the highest insurance premiums.
Meanwhile, the Houthis have been replenishing missile and drone stocks and seeking alternative sources of supply. US Coast Guard Sentinel Class cutter USCGC Clarence Sutphin Jr (WPC 1147) intercepted a dhow in the Arabian Sea on January 28, with Iranian missile and drones components destined for the Houthis on board. And on March 5, the U.S. Treasury announced a series of sanctions connected with Houthi attempts to procure weapons systems directly from Russia, orchestrated by the Houthi external affairs office in Oman led by Mohammad Abdulsalam, who was sanctioned under E.O. 13224 along with his deputy Eshaq Abdulmalek Abdullah Almarwan.
The principal cause of the heightened risk is the fragile situation in Gaza, where the first phase of the ceasefire has ended without agreement on its continuation or a second phase. But the primary catalyst is likely to be the immediate rejection of the Arab League’s proposal for the reconstruction of Gaza by both Israel and the United States.
The US rejection has been accompanied by powerful American statements of intent, which on March 4 included both a B-52 patrol off the Gaza coast and deliveries of heavyweight bombs via C-17s flying into Nevatim in Israel. A tweet from President Trump set the tone: "People of Gaza, if you (continue) to hold hostages, you are dead."
Arab states have long sought to remain on good terms with the United States while building links with America’s adversaries. Egypt, which hosted the Arab League summit, is also a large recipient of US military assistance. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have recently boosted their diplomatic ties with Iran, while accommodating US military assets. Likewise, Qatar still tolerates both a Hamas presence and the important US airbase at Al Udeid. Oman exercises with the Iranians and provides a safe refuge for the Houthis to pursue international objectives, whilst at the same time also providing port facilities to the US Navy at Duqm.
All these relationships entail a delicate balancing act by Arab governments, a component of which is appeasing very strong popular support for Hamas and Palestine, which will be further inflamed by the rejection of the Arab League proposal. For some of the weaker governments, maintaining this balance is a real struggle – which may, for example, explain a recent flurry of UK Royal Air Force flights into Jordan.
A high stakes, maximum pressure attempt to settle the Gaza crisis brings with it two principal risks. The first is that of unrest within Arab states, and the potential economic damage such unrest might cause in terms of disruption to trade and supplies of oil and gas. The second risk is that the Houthis will resume their attacks on the Red Sea traffic. Behind both risks is the Iranian regime, itself in a nervous and vulnerable state. The major shipping companies are probably exercising good judgment at present by holding off any return to the Red Sea.
The opinions expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of The Maritime Executive.