Mitigating Threats to Undersea Internet Infrastructure

Submarine cables and the internet traffic they carry, including as much as 99 percent of international telecommunications data, have been a focus area for government officials in recent months. In June 2018, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned entities supporting Russia's "underwater capabilities," citing concerns of Russian activity "tracking undersea communication cables." The sanctions shortly followed the re-establishment of a NATO command post tracking Russian submarines in December 2017, prompted by the same concerns of Russian activity near submarine cables.
 
Australian officials have sounded similar alarms regarding control of submarine cables. Recently, the head of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) directly intervened in negotiations to prevent Chinese firm Huawei from receiving a contract to lay cable providing internet to the Solomon Islands, citing Chinese ownership of a cable connected to Australia's network infrastructure as an unacceptable cybersecurity risk. Ultimately, in a deal finalized in June 2018, Australia agreed to cover two thirds of the construction costs using foreign aid funds to ensure an Australian firm received the award.

Despite security apprehensions regarding submarine cables, attempts to interfere with their infrastructure are blunted by a number of factors. For example, clandestinely intercepting data on cables would likely be impeded by physical constraints, network operators' ability to monitor for atypical activity and an inability to make use of intercepted data, as nearly three quarters of internet traffic is encrypted in transit.

Cable breaks are a relatively common occurrence today, and as many as 100 breaks occur per year on average; two thirds of which are the result of accidents involving commercial vessels. A more realistic threat is disrupting internet access by intentionally severing the cables. While some officials have warned that such attacks could "immediately and potentially catastrophically" impact the economy, redundant infrastructure would also limit the effects of these accidents and attacks.
 
There are instances in which cable breaks can have outsized impacts, including incidents of simultaneous cable breaks or breaks within regions lacking redundant infrastructure. In 2006, an earthquake simultaneously severed eight cables off the coast of Taiwan, resulting in the loss of 90 percent of the data traffic between China, the U.S. and Europe. Similarly, in an incident in 2008, two cables carrying 90 percent of internet traffic through the Suez Canal were broken, obstructing internet access for 75 million people across North Africa, the Middle East and South Asia.
 
Given the global nature of the maritime industry, and the need for offices and shoreside IT infrastructure, maritime organizations may be particularly vulnerable to disruptions of limited infrastructure serving isolated regions. While private sector organizations may have little control over nation-state activities targeting submarine cables, they can factor disruptive risks stemming from cable breaks, intentional or accidental, into decisions regarding the IT infrastructure used at sites around the world. 

To mitigate the impact of submarine cable breaks, companies can conduct assessments with their network carriers to identify sites in regions that lack cable redundancy. To prevent any incidents from occurring, companies can lease more fiber, engage with a separate ISP for backup or ensure critical data at sites without redundant connectivity are backed-up at facilities in other regions.

Jacob Styczynski is an Analyst at Booz Allen Hamilton.