Hormuz Attacks and Counterattacks Mark a Change in Strategy
Readers of The Maritime Executive will not be surprised by the collapse of the 60-day ceasefire during which negotiations between Iran and the United States were supposed to take place on the basis of a 14-point Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). The starting position for the United States laid out in the MoU has made it difficult to envisage that the United States would emerge from the negotiations with any of its war aims achieved. In contrast, the starting position for Iran offered the prospect of a lifting of sanctions which in turn would provide the finance necessary for the Islamic regime to prolong its grip on power in Iran for decades to come. But even the minimalist gains sought by the United States – essentially, the achievement of peace in the short term to provide relief from domestic economic and electoral pressures – could only have been achieved by compromising the national security and economic wellbeing of both the Gulf States and Israel. The Gulf States and Israel seem to have been prepared to give the MoU negotiations a chance, but cannot countenance a failure in any agreement to safeguard their vital interests – and they have ample means of sabotaging the ceasefire and negotiations if such a conclusion had been imminent.
For the moment, with positions as they are, even if negotiations proceed, they have almost no hope of success. Hence both Iran and the United States are adjusting their end-game strategies, and this is apparent in the character of attacks and counter-attacks in recent days. Both are now playing a longer game, the outcome of which improves the chances that the United States will prevail.
Central Command counter-strikes following the IRGC's attacks on Al Rekayyat (IMO 9397339), Wedyan (IMO 9524970) and Cyprus Prosperity (IMO 9595216), plus the threats made to many others between July 6-8, indicate that CENTCOM is still intent on wearing down the IRGC's ability to target shipping in the Strait, striking targets in Sirik, Qeshm and elsewhere. But there can no longer be confidence that the IRGC capability in this area can be completely neutralized. It is too easy for the IRGC to hide drone mobile launchers. Given their range, they could be laagered anywhere within the 50,000 square miles of the Hormuz littoral. Moreover, many of the IRGC drone and anti-ship missiles have autonomous target acquisition in the closing stages of flight, meaning that they are not dependent on a sophisticated fixed surveillance system for targeting success.
The best that CENTCOM will probably be able to achieve is to suppress the scale of attacks that the IRGC are able to mount, and then to provide close-in air defense – largely from aerial platforms such as attack helicopters – to help protect merchant captains willing to risk taking their ships though the Strait. If such a strategy facilitates the passage of say 30 ships per day, down from the 120 transits seen before February 28, then this will likely avert or delay a global economic meltdown, particularly as alternative trade and export routes avoiding the Strait are being ramped up all the time. But in contrast, a re-imposition of the US blockade on ports and ships would be disastrous for Iran.
Increasing the economic leverage on Iran is evident also in the revocation of Iranian oil export licenses, granted temporarily during the ceasefire. It is also evident in the attacks made on port facilities in Chah Bahar, far from Hormuz, which the Iranians may have thought, being close to the border with Pakistan, was their most secure maritime escape and exit route. But perhaps the strongest evidence of the new US strategy has been the attacks in Golestan Province on railways in the northeast connecting Iran to China through Turkmenistan. One can probably expect some attacks on shipping on the Caspian Sea in the near future, attacking another Iranian import/export route. Closing down Iran's ability to import, export and raise revenue will generate huge internal pressures on the IRGC/hardliner regime, which knows that without food, water, wages and power, the Iranian population will become mutinous; for the IRGC, widespread economic unrest is much harder to quell than political dissent.
The Iranian actions in recent days also confirm that a new strategic calculus is in place. The IRGC have seen their control of the Strait beginning to slip away as the Omani coastal route becomes viable, and this is a vital tool which they must maintain if they are to retain their strong negotiating position. But the IRGC is still permitting Hormuz transits, free of charge for the moment, for those using the northern PGRA. This could be interpreted as an attempt to keep the route open for their own tanker exports, maybe to ingratiate themselves with some of the GCC countries, a tactic which clearly has not worked. Neither are GCC countries likely to be mollified by the IRGC focusing its own reprisal attacks only on US bases in their countries.
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This turn of events is for the moment encouraging. The United States can apply economic pressure on Iran with a relatively small military footprint, and the B-52s have already gone home to Barksdale. It can also probably facilitate some traffic flows through the Strait, sufficient to postpone global economic meltdown – for long enough to see Iran buckle economically first.
The IRGC are avid readers of the Maritime Executive too, and are tactically adept and flexible. One can expect the IRGC to attempt to regain the initiative – for example by activating a Houthi closure of the Bab el Mandeb, if the Houthis are minded to comply. But time is not on their side. The extraordinary patience and forbearance which GCC countries have extended towards Iran, notwithstanding what social media in the Gulf characterizes as Iranian treachery, is probably now at an end. Not even the Qataris have been spared. Not content with raiding Qatar and destroying an LNG train in Ras Laffan, the IRGC is now intent on attacking Qatari LNG tankers, while at the same time accepting Qatari hospitality as the MoU technical negotiations stutter on in Doha. Local beliefs have it that kindness must be repaid with kindness, not harm.
The opinions expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of The Maritime Executive.
