Ferry Fire Investigation Reveals a Series of Failings
The U.K. Maritime Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) has released its report into the fire on the DFDS ferry Dieppe Seaways, highlighting problems with the actions taken by the crew and issuing a warning about the use of dry powder in fire extinguishing.
On May 1, 2014, the Dieppe Seaways was approaching the Eastern Ferry Terminal at the Port of Dover when an uncontrolled fire broke out in the furnace of the port thermal oil heater. The incident resulted in serious injuries to one firefighter and two crew members.
The vessel was met by a team from Kent Fire and Rescue Service on arrival at the berth. Liaison between the team and ship’s staff, and the subsequent control of fire-fighting, were incomplete and not fully coordinated, states the investigation report. An initial entry into the port boiler room was attempted, which resulted in a backdraught with an accompanying fireball that caused a number of casualties and necessitated the shutdown of the compartment. A strategy of containment, cooling and boundary monitoring was then initiated until it was deemed safe to re-enter the compartment some hours later.
The investigation identified that a crack in the thermal oil heater coil allowed thermal oil to enter the furnace, resulting in an uncontrolled furnace fire. It is concluded that the coil failed as a result of stress caused by the weld securing the refractory insulation support plate.
The coil in the port thermal oil heater on board Dieppe Seaways failed as a result of stress caused by the weld securing the refractory insulation support plate to the coil. Adverse conditions within the port boiler room prevented manual operation of the coil pressure relief valve. Remote operating positions for the coil pressure relief valve would have allowed the oil pressure to be reduced without risk of supplementing the fuel supply to the fire.
Ship’s staff attempted to extinguish the fire using methods based on experience from a similar incident that had occurred on the same unit in 2009. However, on the 2014 occasion, the burner unit opened as a result of the fire and this allowed the fire to develop beyond the furnace; a fact not recognized by the crew.
The investigation report states that the chief engineer’s previous experience from 2009 appeared to have unduly influenced his evaluation of information that was available to him. A comprehensive review involving all of the key ship’s staff might have identified that the fire had, or had the potential to, spread to the port boiler room.
The absence of a standard operating procedure for dealing with a fire on the thermal oil heating system installation meant that such a scenario had not been exercised as part of the training program on board Dieppe Seaways.
The section of coil that failed was particularly difficult to inspect visually due to the refractory insulation in the vicinity. In such circumstances it would have been more appropriate to pressure test the coil, as recommended in DNV GL Rules for Classification of Ships, during the intermediate survey earlier in the year, states the report. The lack of detailed maintenance records and no evidence that classification society approval had previously been given for repairs to the port thermal oil heater might have prevented DNV GL from issuing pertinent advice to its surveyors.
The investigation highlights the safety issues:
• The importance of positive control of firefighting efforts with ship’s master retaining overall responsibility for the safety of the ship and crew.
• The overarching requirement for the command team to continually review actions taken by both ship’s crew and shore firefighters ensuring that their actions are complementary and do not compromise each other’s safety.
• Maintenance records must be comprehensive highlighting equipment failures/deficiencies to allow inspections and surveys to focus on high risk areas.
Recommendations have been made to the thermal oil heater manufacturer, Prozess-Wärmeträgertechnik GmbH, to investigate alternative methods of securing the refractory insulation plate; the ship’s classification society, DNV GL, to provide additional guidance to its surveyors with regard to examining thermal oil heaters; and both DNV GL and DFDS, to review the suitability of dry powder as a fixed fire-extinguishing medium for use in thermal oil heater furnaces.
The report is available here.