With Purge, Xi's Military Control Rises - And So Do Regional Risks

By decisively consolidating his personal power, President Xi Jinping’s latest purge of senior military leadership increases strategic risk for the Indo-Pacific.

The investigation of two of China’s most senior military commanders removes experienced voices from the center of decision-making for the armed forces. While the upheaval may temporarily dampen China’s military readiness, over time it risks leaving Xi increasingly insulated from professional advice, elevating the prospect of miscalculation in the use of the armed forces.

The investigation of the officers, Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, marks one of the most consequential political-military purges in China’s armed forces in decades. Zhang, a Politburo member and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, and Liu, chief of staff of the commission’s Joint Staff Department, sat at the apex of China’s military system. Their sudden removal for alleged disciplinary and legal violations has hollowed out the military’s most important governing body and no doubt shaken the armed forces’ senior leadership.

The immediate effect is stark. The seven-member Central Military Commission has been effectively reduced to just two figures—Xi Jinping himself and political commissar Zhang Shengmin.

Zhang Youxia’s downfall is particularly striking. Long viewed as untouchable, he was a red aristocrat with revolutionary pedigree, deep personal ties to Xi, and rare combat experience. He was among the oldest senior commanders to have fought in China’s 1979 war with Vietnam. Unlike much of today’s Chinese military leadership, whose experience is shaped overwhelmingly by exercises, simulations and political work, Zhang had seen the realities of combat. He was widely regarded by observers as one of the few generals who was likely capable of telling Xi what he needed to hear, not simply what the party leader wanted to hear.

With this move, Xi has reinforced a central truth of Chinese civil-military relations: the military is not a national army; it is the armed wing of the Communist Party and ultimately an instrument of Xi’s personal authority. The purge confirms that no pedigree, no combat record and no past loyalty confer immunity when control is at stake.

For Australia and the region, the implications are complex and unfold over time. Beijing’s strategic ambitions will not change. Xi will not abandon efforts towards coercing Taiwan, dominating the South China Sea and pushing the United States and its allies from their once dominant position in maritime Asia.

In the near term, the purge may introduce a degree of stability. Removing senior commanders disrupts planning, weakens cohesion and may degrade readiness, particularly for a major combat contingency such as Taiwan. A military preoccupied with internal discipline campaigns, loyalty checks and political rectification is unlikely to press aggressively for major external operations.

Over time, however, the risks begin to accumulate. The removal of experienced commanders increases the likelihood that Xi will be advised by officers selected primarily for obedience rather than professional judgment. Governing a country as complex as China, and managing its expanding use of military power, requires advice that is frank, credible and willing to confront uncomfortable tradeoffs.

History offers cautionary parallels. Leaders surrounded by deferential advisers are more prone to miscalculation. They may underestimate costs, overestimate military effectiveness, or misread adversary resolve. Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine stands as a contemporary example of how insulated decision-making can produce catastrophic outcomes when professional military advice is sidelined.

To date, Xi’s direction of military power has been assertive but not reckless. He has pushed red lines in the South China Sea through militarized outposts and aggressive intercepts. He has intensified pressure on Taiwan while managing escalation. Along the border with India, he has authorized forceful actions while keeping conflict within limits that Beijing presumably considers controllable. Measured advice from senior commanders has almost certainly shaped this approach. Figures such as Zhang Youxia would have played a key role in defining where calculated risk ended and unacceptable danger began.

So where does this leave China now? The purge reinforces a trajectory evident since Xi came to power in 2012, marked by the steady concentration of authority in the hands of one leader and the erosion of collective decision-making within the system.

Xi will continue to seek incremental progress on Taiwan while remaining acutely aware of the severe risks that open conflict would pose to the party and his own rule. He will also want to advance China’s control over key maritime domains within the first island chain while expanding the military’s ability to project power farther afield. His approach is likely to remain one of calibrated progress and measured risk-taking, aimed at shifting the strategic balance without triggering war.

Yet the quality of advice shaping those judgements may be changing. In the run-up to the 21st Party Congress in 2027, Xi is likely to elevate a new generation of commanders into the largely vacant Central Military Commission. This nearly blank slate gives him the opportunity not only to reshuffle personnel but also to reshape the commission itself. Based on the pattern of purges over the past several years, loyalty is likely to weigh more heavily than experience in those selections.

As China continues to push red lines through military pressure around Taiwan, coercive activity at sea and unsafe air and maritime intercepts, the strategic environment will continue to be volatile. But by removing the voices most capable of imposing restraint and moderating risk, he has made China’s future behaviour harder to predict and the region less secure.

Joe Keary is a senior analyst at ASPI.

The opinions expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of The Maritime Executive.