Understanding Indonesia's Gambit With China in the South China Sea

 

[By Emirza Adi Syailendra]

China and Indonesia recognise that they have overlapping claims in the South China Sea. However, this should not be construed as Indonesia’s acknowledging the legitimacy of the nine-dash line. Mutual recognition of disputes by both parties does not automatically give credence to the other party’s claim. Likewise, merely denying the existence of a dispute does not negate its reality. As the International Court of Justice noted in the Interpretation of Peace Treaties case: “Whether there exists an international dispute is a matter for objective determination.” These legal principles are essential to understanding the dynamics between Indonesia and China and the significance of their recent 2024 Joint Statement during President Prabowo Subianto’s visit to Beijing on 9 November.

Some critics argue that Indonesia has yielded to China, recognised the “nine-dash line”, or demand that Prabowo refrained from executing the statement by establishing bilateral cooperation to manage disputes. But recognising the existence of disputes does not signify Indonesia yielding to Beijing but acknowledges a natural progression in response to China’s assertive stance. Indonesia’s acknowledgment of disputes with China in the Joint Statement simply recognises the reality that disputes already existed because both sides have used legal arguments against one another since mid-2016.

As legal scholar Christopher Schreuer has previously observed, “Very little is required in the way of the expression of opposing positions by the parties to establish a dispute. In particular, the denial of the existence of a dispute by one party will be to no avail.” Therefore, Indonesia’s options are limited to shaping domestic rhetoric around these disputes, rather than preventing their existence. This should not necessarily be viewed as yielding to China.

Nevertheless, this joint statement is notable, even though its significance needs to be put into perspective.

Although Indonesian policymakers have previously floated ideas of joint cooperation in the Natunas with China, including Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa in 2014 and Coordinating Minister of Maritime Affairs Luhut Panjaitan in 2016, this is the first time such intent has been formalised in writing. It departs from Indonesia’s longstanding policy of denying disagreements over whether China’s nine-dash line intersects with Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Natunas.

Since 1995, following Indonesia’s then foreign minister Ali Alatas’ visit to Beijing, Jakarta and Beijing had for a long time maintained that no disputes exist, downplaying any potential disagreements. Even in March 2016, when China Coast Guard vessels intervened as Indonesia attempted to seize a Chinese fishing boat, Kway Fey, caught in the Natuna EEZ, China’s foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying dismissed the incident, reiterating that “Indonesia has no territorial claims over China’s Nansha Islands, and China fully agrees that the Natuna Islands belong to Indonesia.”

But a shift occurred in the months afterwards. For the first time, in response to a subsequent standoff between the Indonesian Navy and two CCG vessels that attempted to stop the arrest of a Chinese fishing boat, China employed a legal argument against Indonesia: “This took place in waters which are Chinese fishermen’s traditional fishing grounds and where China and Indonesia have overlapping claims for maritime rights and interests.” (emphasis added) China had used such a legal point against other South China Sea disputants, but not against Indonesia.

Indonesia countered by citing the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea, arguing that traditional fishing grounds are not legally recognised. As Indonesia and China began presenting legal arguments against each other – China relying on historical claims and Indonesia invoking UNCLOS – it marked the start of a formal dispute over fishing rights.

Foreign fishing vessels that have been captured and sunk in Natuna waters near Lagong island in Riau Islands province, Indonesia (Bay Ismoyo/AFP via Getty Images)

By 2021, Chinese fishing activities and law enforcement encroachments in the Natunas had become frequent. In response, Indonesia inaugurated a new military unit in the Natunas in 2019, conducted large-scale military exercises in 2020 and 2021, and intensified its defence diplomacy with the United States, focusing on border defence. Against this backdrop, China sent a diplomatic note in August 2021, demanding that Jakarta cease its activities in the Tuna Block. China’s denial of Indonesia’s right to drill gas within its continental shelf marked an expansion of its claim from traditional fishing grounds to broader maritime jurisdiction.

By this point, based on my fieldwork in Jakarta in the early 2022, key factions within the Jokowi administration had come to see denying disputes as no longer viable—a perspective that has persisted into Prabowo’s administration.

Interviews with stakeholders in 2022 revealed that the Jokowi administration was exploring alternative approaches, including those now enacted by Prabowo, and concluded that a tacit understanding allowing both sides to coexist in contested regions was preferable. Prabowo has evidently taken this a step further, offering to recognise the existence of overlapping claims with Beijing in exchange for Beijing’s support for Indonesia’s own domestic and geopolitical goals, particularly regarding its ambition to be part of Electric Vehicle global value chain.

Recognising disputes, as Prabowo has done, creates new opportunities – either for aggressively contesting Beijing’s nine-dash line through an international tribunal, as the Philippines has done in the past, or for managing tensions while shelving disputes. Jakarta and Beijing have favoured the latter approach since the joint statement was issued.

Jakarta might continue to deny being a claimant in the South China Sea disputes, as it does not claim any features in the Spratlys or Paracels. However, by acknowledging the disputes, it could collaborate with other Southeast Asian claimants to influence their resolution – whether through the conclusion of the long negotiations for a Code of Conduct or other mechanisms.

The question remains: can Prabowo solidify the alleged benefits of Beijing formally acknowledging these disputes?

Emirza Adi Syailendra is a PhD Scholar at the Strategic and Defence University, the Australian National University. He is also a Co-Investigator of a Strategic Policy Grant on Indonesia’s Maritime Strategy.

This article appears courtesy of The Interpreter and may be found in its original form here.