Tehran Revives Disputes in the Gulf to Boost Patriotic Support at Home

 

The United Arab Emirates regularly uses meetings of the Gulf Cooperation Council leadership, the UN General Assembly and bilateral Heads of State visits to reassert its position on the three Disputed Islands in the Gulf, seeking an end to Iranian occupation of the islands.

Greater and Lesser Tumb, and the island of Abu Musa, were occupied by Iran under the Shah on November 30, 1971. Iran has long claimed that the takeover was a product of an agreement with the British, who were withdrawing from the Gulf, but diplomatic papers of the time unambiguously contradict this. The day before the Iranian occupation, the Emirate of Sharjah had agreed to share administration of Abu Musa with Iran, but the seizure then contravened this very limited agreement.

Little Tunb and Greater Tunb islands (which belong to the Emirate of Ras Al Khaimah), lie close off the Iranian coast. Shipping in the westerly channel of the Traffic Separation Scheme travels just to the north of these two islands, and easterly traffic just to the south. Abu Musa sits midway in the middle of the Gulf, providing a forward base for Iran's armed forces overlooking the Emirati coast. All three islands are heavily fortified and defended, and host naval and missile systems. If Emirati sovereignty over the islands was ever recovered, it would expand the Emirati sphere of influence in the Gulf significantly northwards, and push back forward Iranian defensive positions which dominate international shipping channels.

Traffic Separation Scheme shipping channels (public domain)

The UAE has attempted, along with Saudi Arabia, to improve relations with Iran, on the basis that regional stability is more important than prosecuting this 54-year-old dispute. But Iran knows it can use the historic dispute as a populist, nationalist trigger, to be activated whenever Iran's religious leaders feel popular support for the regime is ebbing. Most Iranians believe the Disputed Islands belong to Iran, and their patriotic support for this cause tends to trump their loathing of their religious leaders.

In recent days, as the religious leadership feels under more and more pressure, this dispute has been fired up in an attempt to bolster the regime.

Responding to the routine statement in support of restitution of the Disputed Islands made at the 46th GCC leaders' meeting in Bahrain, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei and Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Speaker of the Parliament of Iran, both rejected and condemned the GCC statement.

But other Iranian leaders added two additional disputes into the mix. Former Iranian foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, speaking at the Doha Forum 2025 last week, tried to undermine an understanding reached between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia on division of energy rights in the Dorra offshore gas field, which lies off the coast in a neutral zone between the two countries. Iran has a potential claim to a very small share of the Dorra field, the northern tip of which falls just inside what might be construed as the Iranian EEZ, but where the border between Kuwait and Iran has not been agreed. After having its over-optimistic opening bid rejected, Iran could simply start drilling in what it believes to be its area - but does not have the resources to do so. Iran would rather snipe at Kuwait than return to a sensible negotiation, where a reasonable outcome for Iran might be 5% of the revenues.

Iran has also in recent days revived its 1957 sovereignty claims over Bahrain. Hossein Shariatmadari, the editor of the hardliner-aligned newspaper Kayhan and a close confidant of Supreme leader Ali Khamenei, has decided it is a good time to revive Iran's 1957 claim to the entirety of Bahrain, which he describes as Mishmahig and Iran's 14th province. Shariatmadari described this claim as Iran's '"unignorable right", but one which international bodies rejected decades ago. Even Iran itself recognized Bahraini sovereignty as far back as 1971. Bahrain has for years accused Iran of nonetheless supporting separatists within Bahrain's Shi'a community.

All three of these disputes have lain dormant for years. That Iran has chosen to revive them now is an indication of regime weakness, and the need to call up the patriotism of Iranians. But it also comes at a time when the United States' new National Security Strategy calls for walking back from constant sources of trouble in the region. Perhaps this has been a prompt for Iran, if the United States is to pull back and not get involved, to consider whether the coast is now clear to pursue old nationalistic agendas. As the threat of a reduction in the strength of the US Central Command in the area rises, so too does appreciation of the value of the deterrence and protection which it provides, in particular to global trade and shipping.