NTSB: Grounding Caused by Master Navigating Alone and Multitasking

 

The National Transport Safety Board issued a report critical of the master and operator of a Great Lakes bulker that touched bottom while maneuvering out of Sault Ste. Marine, Ontario in January 2023 saying that the master was required to multitask during a complex maneuver. The report calls for a sufficient number of qualified mariners to be on the bridge, especially at times when a vessel is maneuvering in confined spaces.

The report details the circumstances around the January 7, 2023, incident aboard the American Mariner, a 1980-built laker registered in the United States, owned by American Steamship, and operated by Grand River Navigation. Visibility was good and the wind and sea conditions were calm as the 715-foot-long (218 meters) when the vessel began the departure at around 0720 from Canadian waters and bound for Superior, Wisconsin.

The master was on the bridge while the first mate was supervising unmooring and workboat operations. The bosun and a seaman were on the stern handling lines while other crew had been sent ashore to cast off the mooring lines. The vessel has a total crew of 19, but alone on the bridge, the NTSB concludes the master was required to multitask while managing the departure.

“While maneuvering in confined waters, it is difficult for a single bridge crewmember to effectively drive, lookout, and monitor and use available bridge equipment,” the report concludes. “Owners, operators, and vessel masters are responsible for ensuring that vessel bridge teams are staffed with a sufficient number of certificated/credentialed mariners who are familiar with all bridge navigation equipment and able to independently take immediate action.”

The vessel was traveling at about 4 knots and the master had left the bow thruster on because he was expecting a current in the channel which is about 480 feet wide and has a depth of 24 feet. The channel requires a turn and just outside the buoyed channel are shoal waters. 

As the master straightened the vessel to head outbound, he said he felt a “light shudder.” The fathometer read 13 feet below the keel, and he wondered if they had made contact with ice, although none was visible. Using a searchlight, he confirmed they were clear of a buoy. The first mate in the upper engine room felt a bump and reported a “loud screeching noise.” He thought they might have contacted a buoy but on deck observed mud and rock debris in the water.

 

Hull damage from touching bottom during the maneuver (NTSB)

 

Water levels were not responding as expected the engineers reported in the ballast tanks and subsequently, when the vessel was drydocked three days later, an 80-foot-long hull indentation was found. There were holes in three ballast tanks. The repairs cost $600,000.

The NTSB determined that the master’s initial angle of departure from the dock and a close approach to the shoal water positioned the vessel at a poor angle to complete the maneuver into the channel. The vessel overshoot the turn touching bottom in the shoal on the opposite side of the channel.

The NTSB acknowledges a few other extenuating circumstances. The Canadian Coast Guard in the winter replaces conventional lit buoys with an unlit ice spar buoy to avoid damage to the buoys. On the American Mariner, the master acknowledged that the electronic chart system did not display the footprint of the vessel. Also, safety depths were not programmed into the system.

While they concluded that the master’s multitasking made it difficult to manage the navigation, they also highlighted that effective use of all available resources adds to situational awareness. Proper staffing of the bridge during the departure would have provided additional people to react to the situation and manage the required tasks for safe navigation.