Iranian Armed Forces Deploy Bluff and Empty Rhetoric
During the 12-Day War, the regular Iranian Armed Forces (Artesh) were not the principal target. The Artesh suffered limited damage, primarily to its air defense and air assets. But the impact of the war appears however to have had a much deeper impact on operational effectiveness, by undermining confidence and morale. This is evidenced by the lack of operational and training activity since June, and by the high level of empty and fanciful rhetoric describing Iranian ‘victories’ during the conflict.
Once the Iranian Navy (Nedaja) returned to its principal homeport in Bandar Abbas at the end of August, key capabilities which the Nedaja would need to deploy in order to carry out its blue water mission have remained tied up.
The Nedaja’s five operational Alvand and Moudge Class frigates and the intelligence collection frigate IRINS Zagros (H313) have been alongside since the beginning of September. Throughout this period, the US Navy’s carrier strike group led by USS Nimitz (CVN-68) has cruised undisturbed along the Iranian coastline and taken a break in Jebel Ali for a port visit to Dubai.
Another key Nedaja force component, needed to support any extended operations, are the converted logistic vessels IRINS Makran (K441) and the Nedaja’s latest arrival IRINS Kurdestan (K442). Both ships, moored alongside each other in the outer harbor at Bandar Abbas, have not moved from their pier for weeks.
The Nedaja’s commander, Rear Admiral Shahram Irani, a professional naval officer rather than a political appointee, has unusually made no announcements about operational deployments, nor has greeted any ships on their return to port from deployments, as he is wont to do.
For long-term observers of Artesh activity, the slump in operational and training activity is marked, although some Western press reports continue to reproduce Iranian statements without considering their veracity. Such false reports include claims that the Artesh air force shot down five Israeli F-35s during the war, and that Iranian F-14 pilots had engaged in prolonged dogfights with Israeli aircraft.
A report also likely to be untrue is the suggestion that Iran had taken delivery of MiG-29 aircraft from Russia, as a stopgap while awaiting delivery of Su-35 4th generation fighters. With an ability to fire long-range anti-ship missiles, this could represent an additional threat to shipping off Iran. The reality is however that Iran has for some time possessed a small number of MiG-29 aircraft, deployed at Tehran (TAB-1) and Isfahan (TAB-8) airbases. So the only source of the report, Iranian hardliner politician Abolfazl Zohrevand, was likely inventing a story to cover for the fact that Iran has still not received delivery of Su-35 aircraft from Russia, which were paid for in 2022. These aircraft were built several years ago, and until recently had mostly been parked up outside the factory at Komsomolsk-on-Amur in Siberia, probably lacking electrical control systems. However, the Su-35s taken off the parking lot are still unlikely to be heading for Iran whilst Russia suffers shortages of operational aircraft in its war against Ukraine. There have been no confirmatory Russian reports of any Su-35 deliveries to Iran.
24 Su-35 for Iran in May 2023 (L), 15 Su-35 visible at Komsomolsk in August 2025 (R) (Google Earth/Airbus)
The true state of the Artesh needs to be taken into account when Iran issues threats such as to close the Straits of Hormuz, at a time when Iran is under pressure to resume negotiations over nuclear weapons development. If talks are not resumed, then snap-back sanctions are likely to be imposed on Iran from September 27, resulting in a further rise in political tensions and threats from which the Artesh may wish to excuse themselves.