Op-Ed: Why the Extended Jones Act Waiver Fails Americans

In an August 20, 2026, opinion piece published by The National Interest, “Why the Jones Act’s Temporary Waiver Was Renewed Again,” coauthors Max Pyziur and Matthew Sawoski argue that increased petroleum movements under the temporary Jones Act waiver demonstrate that the law constrains United States energy flows.

What they fail to recognize is that the federal government did not simply open domestic shipping to greater competition. It opened American coastwise trade to foreign-built, foreign-owned, foreign-operated, and foreign-crewed vessels. In doing so, the government effectively excluded Jones Act carriers and United States flag international carriers from participating in the waived trade.

That is not America First. It is a foreign giveaway of American business, cargo, and maritime jobs.

The authors also skip over the legal basis for the waiver. It was issued in the interest of national defense. Yet how does moving asphalt from Louisiana to Connecticut aboard a Chinese-built, Chinese-flagged, Chinese-owned, and Chinese-operated vessel advance United States national defense?

How does employing a foreign vessel with Russian officers and crew to move petroleum products from Louisiana to Florida serve national defense? That question is especially important when Jones Act qualified vessels are available.

A national defense waiver should address an actual national defense necessity when American capacity is unavailable. Using a waiver to replace available American vessels and mariners with Chinese-controlled or Russian-crewed ships turns the national security rationale on its head.

Pyziur and Sawoski point to the increase in foreign vessel movements as evidence of previously suppressed demand. But any surge doesn’t prove that the Jones Act suppressed demand.

California is losing substantial refining capacity. At the same time, global disruptions have reduced traditional supplies of imported gasoline and other refined products, particularly those arriving from Asia. Those structural supply changes, rather than some newly discovered demand, are driving more petroleum products toward California.

The waiver is responding to a changing supply chain. It is not revealing a market created by waivers to the Jones Act.

The authors also overlook a fundamental feature of petroleum markets: arbitrage. A Gulf Coast refiner does not automatically send gasoline, diesel or jet fuel to California simply because foreign ships are temporarily permitted to carry it. Nor does an Alaska North Slope producer automatically send crude oil to a West Coast refinery. Refiners, producers and traders compare the total economics of selling into California, Asia, Europe, Latin America and other markets. They send the barrel to the market that generates the best net return. A waiver changes who may carry the barrel between American ports. It does not determine where that barrel will ultimately be sold.

That is happening right now. Even with the Jones Act waiver in place, United States refiners continue to send extraordinary volumes of refined petroleum products overseas. Recent federal data show distillate exports, including diesel and heating oil, approaching 1.9 million barrels per day. Jet fuel exports have also approached historically high levels. Strong foreign demand and higher margins are pulling American refined fuel into international markets.

This is important because a Jones Act waiver does not reserve even one gallon of American gasoline, diesel or jet fuel for American consumers. To accomplish that, the Administration would have to consider restrictions on exports of refined petroleum products. Reinstating the former crude oil export ban (lifted in 2015) would not, by itself, keep gasoline, diesel or jet fuel in the United States.

Without export restrictions, cargo will continue to follow the best economics. That remains true even when American consumers are paying more at the pump. President Trump is scheduled to meet with United States refiners and fuel retailers at the White House on September 1 to discuss fuel prices and refining capacity. We’ll see what comes of it.

So where is the promised consumer benefit?

The Administration positioned the waiver as a measure that would lower gasoline and diesel prices. California, which the authors hold up as a major beneficiary, provides an uncomfortable reality check.

As of August 31, 2026, the national average for regular gasoline was approximately $4.08 per gallon. In California, regular gasoline averaged approximately $5.69 per gallon, while diesel averaged about $7.29 per gallon. Before the crisis emerged in the Strait of Hormuz, the national average for regular gasoline was approximately $2.98 per gallon.

The foreign vessel movements may be easy to count. The promised savings for American motorists, truckers and businesses have not appeared at the pump.

There is also no need for a Jones Act waiver when a Gulf Coast refinery sends product to the Bahamas for storage, blending or further processing before it is shipped to California. That is international commerce and is not subject to the Jones Act. It has long been an available supply option.

Another major development further undermines the suggestion that these extraordinary Gulf Coast to California movements reveal a permanent maritime market previously suppressed by the Jones Act.

Phillips 66, Kinder Morgan and HF Sinclair have made a final investment decision on the Western Gateway Pipeline. The approximately 1,300 mile refined products system will connect Midwest and Gulf Coast supplies with markets in Arizona and California. That system is designed initially to move approximately 230,000 barrels per day. Completion is targeted for 2029, subject to receiving the necessary permits and regulatory approvals.

Once operating, Western Gateway could fundamentally change the economics of supplying California. There may ultimately be little economic reason for routine shipboard movements of gasoline, diesel or jet fuel from the Gulf Coast to California.

Cargo follows the path of least resistance and the best economics. That path may be a pipeline, a domestic vessel or an export to a foreign market.

Meanwhile, the Trump Administration says America needs more United States mariners, more American ships and greater domestic shipbuilding capacity. Yet the waiver takes domestic cargo that sustains that industrial base and hands it to foreign-built vessels. Those ships are operated by foreign companies and crewed by foreign mariners.

Emergency Jones Act waivers should remain available when national defense genuinely requires them and American vessels cannot meet the need. That is far different from using an international crisis to replace available American shipping with the foreign flag fleet.

Pyziur and Sawoski have not demonstrated that American consumers are meaningfully better off. They have not shown that these foreign coastwise movements advance national defense. Nor have they established that temporary shipping patterns created by an extraordinary waiver represent the future of America’s energy supply chain.

William P. Doyle is a former United States Federal Maritime Commissioner, former Chief Executive of the Port of Baltimore and a licensed officer in the United States Merchant Marine. He also served as Director of Permits and Compliance for the Office of the Federal Coordinator for Alaska Natural Gas Transportation Projects. He currently serves as Chief Executive Officer of the Dredging Contractors of America. Doyle is a graduate of Widener University Commonwealth Law School and holds a Bachelor of Science in Marine Engineering from the Massachusetts Maritime Academy.

The opinions expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of The Maritime Executive.