Countering China's Maritime Insurgency in the South Pacific

 

[By Jason Lancaster]

Guadalcanal, the Coral Sea, Tarawa, New Guinea, and Iron Bottom Sound highlight the strategic location of the South Pacific during the Second World War. Today, U.S. and allied preeminence in this vital region is under threat. The People’s Republic of China (PRC,) through a sophisticated blend of economic inducements, political influence, and maritime coercion, is executing a campaign to erode U.S. and allied presence and reshape the Indo-Pacific order. Such activities mirror the tactics of insurgency, where control is gained not just through force, but by blurring legal boundaries, exploiting economic vulnerability, and using civilian fronts to advance strategic ends.

The PRC’s maritime insurgency is not limited to the South China Sea. It is a global phenomenon. This maritime insurgency is not fought with gunfire but with corruption, development loans and aid, and the PRC’s deep-water fishing fleet. More than 17,000 vessels fishing throughout the world routinely engage in Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (IUUF), often acting as a civilian vanguard for PRC state objectives. The situation is particularly acute in the South Pacific, where Chinese fishing fleets exploit the limited enforcement capacity of Pacific Island Countries (PICs), deplete sovereign marine resources, and undermine local economies, eroding governance, and sovereignty in the process. 

The South Pacific is by no means a strategic backwater. It lies astride the sea lines of communication connecting U.S. treaty allies in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia.  It is home to key U.S. territories such as Guam and American Samoa. It includes the Compact of Free Association (COFA) states Micronesia, Palau, and the Marshall Islands. At its heart are the fourteen Pacific Island Countries. possess rich marine resources, and command strategic real estate that could either anchor regional stability or serve as launchpads for malign influence.

Historically, the U.S., Australia, and New Zealand have been the region’s primary security and development partners. However, since 2018, the PRC has dramatically expanded its presence building dual-use infrastructure, embedding security arrangements, and offering opaque development assistance. Despite sustained Western aid to these nations, Beijing’s influence has surged. The construction of Chinese-funded ports and runways in the Solomon Islands and Kiribati. Long range missiles stationed in the Kiribati or the Solomons could threaten Hawaii, Australia, and the continental U.S., compromising freedom of navigation, eroding regional deterrence, and challenging the U.S. ability to defend treaty partners Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines.

IUUF is a major threat to PIC economies. Fishing is a major contributor to many PIC economies and IUUF challenges the ability of states to create revenue, further condemning them to a future of dependency on international development aid. The United States can enhance its hard power in the Indo-Pacific by utilizing soft power to counter IUUF and provide humanitarian assistance, thereby denying PRC regional influence.

Countering IUUF

The United States does not need to develop a new engagement strategy with South Pacific nations from whole cloth. The Pacific Island Forum produces its own strategic documents. Composed of 18 members and associate member states, the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) serves as a unifying voice for the small states of the South Pacific. Australia and New Zealand are full members while U.S. territories Guam and American Samoa are associate members. The 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent and the 2018 Boe Declaration on Regional Security articulate shared South Pacific security concerns and development goals. The United States and its allies are already adopting PIF strategic documents for engagement with Pacific Island Countries to achieve mutual successes. 

Countering IUUF and other forms of transnational crime is a top PIF priority, second only to climate change and rising sea levels. While the United States pays signatory nations US$60 million a year over ten years for the privilege of fishing within PIC Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) under the South Pacific Tuna Treaty, the PRC flagrantly disregards the sovereignty of Pacific Island states while plundering their maritime bounty. Pacific Island nations do not have the capacity to police their expansive EEZs against massive fishing fleets without assistance. 

Pacific Fusion Center

The PIF’s 2018 Boe Declaration recommended various security proposals to defend PIF interests. One was the development of a Pacific Fusion Center to support the collation, sharing, and analysis of intelligence. The Pacific Island Forum stood up a Pacific Fusion Center in Vanuatu in 2021. The fusion center “enhances information sharing, cooperation, analysis and assessment, and expands situational awareness and capacity across the Pacific.” The fusion center provides an opportunity to expand multinational cooperation in the region and expand defense and security force capacity. To successfully counter transnational crime, the U.S. should support and increase the capacity of the Pacific Fusion Center with the mid-term goal of turning it into a maritime headquarters, increase the capacity to enforce PIC EEZs and laws, and increase regional maritime domain awareness fed into the Pacific Fusion Center.

Through US associate PIF members Guam and American Samoa, the U.S should offer USCG support for the center to immediately increase its effectiveness. With a mid-term goal of creating a PIC-led multilateral maritime headquarters like the Combined Maritime Forces headquarters in Bahrain, this multinational maritime headquarters would be rotationally led by PICs with Australian, New Zealand, and U.S. support, and would have tactical control of forces regionally assigned to countering transnational crime.

The Pacific Fusion Center will not be effective without forces at sea enabling maritime domain awareness (MDA). MDA supports two vital interests: enabling US, Australian, New Zealand, and local PIC forces to intercept and eliminate IUUF, and monitoring the PLAN in the region. IUUF fleets are vast. This was illustrated off South America, in February 2025, when the Argentine Navy tracked over 380 PRC flagged fishing vessels near the Argentine economic exclusion zone, requiring Argentina to send two warships and two aircraft—a sizable portion of its deployable blue water forces—to monitor these fishing vessels. The United States can support MDA through multiple asset types to identify potential threats within the maritime domain, supporting both the Pacific Fusion Center and a PIF response at sea.

Improving Capacity

Most PICs have little capability to enforce their own EEZs. Australia’s mitigation for the PIC’s lack of resources is the Pacific Maritime Security Program. This security assistance program provides Guardian-Class patrol boats, an equivalent of the USCG’s fast response cutter (FRC), along with crew training and maintenance for every PIC. The program has provided a total of 22 patrol boats over 30-year program. This effort has been a mixed success, as the region is full of marked and unmarked reefs and multiple ships have met with accidents. In December 2024 the new Fijian patrol boat RFNS Timo was damaged while docking. Timo is a replacement vessel for RFNS Puamau, which hit a reef and sank in June 2024. Timo completed her first patrol in April 2025. Despite this program many of these countries still do not have the capacity to patrol the entirety of their EEZs. The geography is a demanding one—the EEZ of Kiribati is roughly the size of the continental United States. The RAN and RNZN also have capacity issues. The RAN and RNZN serve dual functions, conducting both war at sea and law enforcement missions. The RNZN’s new force design will reduce the availability of RNZN vessels to conduct regional constabulary duties.

The US Coast Guard (USCG) faces budgetary and ship number restrictions, but they are the regions preferred US service for cooperation. With local agreements, the USCG can help increase regional capacity. USCG District Oceania, formerly District 14’s area of responsibility is the Pacific with ships based in Honolulu and Guam. The USCG has two national security cutters, one medium endurance cutter, three Fast Response Cutters (FRCs), and three buoy tenders stationed in Honolulu, as well as three FRCs and a buoy tender based in Guam. The U.S. Navy supports USCG missions as able. These efforts are primarily focused on the U.S. and COFA state EEZs. USCG ships are responsible for patrolling thousands of miles of both U.S. and COFA EEZs. The distances involved are vast: it is 850 miles from Guam to Palau and over 5,000 miles from Honolulu to American Samoa. In addition to fisheries protection, these cutters are also responsible for counter-narcotics, smuggling, other law enforcement requirements, and search and rescue.

The United States must increase its regional naval presence to reassure citizens, partners, and potential partners. Utilizing USCG assets reassures regional allies and partners while minimizing the threat of escalation with the PRC, reducing fears and potential misgivings of U.S. intent. The United States should increase USCG District Oceania’s assets by relocating four Fast Response Cutters currently homeported in Bahrain to the South Pacific. The increased presence of Littoral Combat Ships in U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility would mitigate the reallocation of the four FRCs. 

Eradicating IUUF

Increased and improved provision of command and control and MDA and increased capacity to intercept IUUF fishermen is required for the eradication of IUUF. Officials at the New Zealand embassy stated that there were not sufficient naval forces in the region to enforce EEZs across the multitude of countries. Legal action offers an essential tool to deter further incursions despite limited forces at sea.

PICs should be provided legal, domestic, and security assistance to prosecute transnational crime. Most PRC fishing captains work for state owned enterprises tied to important CCP bosses. Linking senior CCP party members to illegal behavior that costs PIC citizens jobs, money, and resources for the future could be a method to end IUUF as well as deter future PRC illegal activities. Convictions in absentia after fair public trials are a method to deter PRC activity and highlight PRC malign influence. 

Healthcare and Pacific Partnership

Medical support is one of the most frequently requested forms of aid from PICs. The U.S. Navy’s Pacific Partnership is hugely popular in the region and provides life-changing care. The popularity of the mission should drive the U.S. and allies to increase the frequency of visits with increased allied support. USNS Mercy does not participate every year, but there has been an attempt at her participation every two years.

The Department of Defense should discuss RAN, RNZN, and Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force support for increasing the number of Pacific Partnership missions. Although none of these navies have a dedicated hospital ship like USNS Mercy, each nation has a ship suitable for these missions and the capacity to send a single vessel for a 3–4-month humanitarian deployment to the South Pacific. A planned rotation of USN, RAN, USN, RNZN, USN, JMSDF provides a six-year cycle that enables maintenance, training, and other operational requirements to be scheduled. The U.S. off-years would still see U.S. mission support with a ship as well as medical personnel. U.S. years would have USNS Mercy support.

The Navy should hub a medical expeditionary ship (T-EMS) in Yap, Federated States of Micronesia to support smaller scale but persistent humanitarian medical support in the region. These vessels contain one or two operating rooms and are extremely suitable for this mission because of their shallow draft and hospital level facilities and ability to embark helicopters. The T-EMS’s sister ships, the fast expeditionary transports (T-EPFs) have been frequently used for Pacific Partnership stations, demonstrating the utility of this class for use in the South Pacific.

Conclusion

The South Pacific region holds immense strategic value for the United States and its allies. Located at the heart of key U.S. alliances and territories, the region has drawn increasing attention from the PRC, whose maritime gray zone insurgent activities threaten to undermine regional security, economic stability, and political alignment.

The PRC’s deepening engagement with PICs, particularly through dual-use infrastructure, strategic partnerships, and coercive economic practices has shifted the balance of influence away from traditional allies like the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. The potential for Chinese military assets in Kiribati or the Solomon Islands should be viewed as a severe threat to U.S. territories and Indo-Pacific allies. Coupled with increased PLAN presence and aggressive operations, this trend signals a challenge to U.S. freedom of movement and regional dominance.

To effectively counter this encroachment, the U.S. must commit to a comprehensive, multi-pronged strategy that integrates regional security support, humanitarian assistance, and institutional cooperation. Expanding the Pacific Fusion Center will strengthen intelligence sharing and regional coordination and MDA. Increased USCG presence would deter illegal activities like unregulated fishing and support local law enforcement capabilities. These efforts should be pursued in partnership with Australia, New Zealand, and other like-minded nations to promote regional ownership and reduce perceptions of neocolonial influence.

Combating transnational crime, particularly illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing requires not only physical presence but also legal and political resolve. Holding senior PRC officials accountable through international legal mechanisms can deter further violations and reinforce the rule of law. In parallel, bolstering regional healthcare through expanded Pacific Partnership missions and sustained medical presence such as stationing a T-EMS in Micronesia will address urgent humanitarian needs and enhance U.S. soft power. Ultimately, securing the South Pacific is not solely about countering PRC influence. It involves empowering Pacific Island Countries, reaffirming the United States’ commitment to its allies, and ensuring that the region remains free, open, and resilient.

Commander Jason Lancaster is a Surface Warfare Officer. He has served at sea in amphibious ships , destroyers, and a destroyer squadron. Ashore he has served as an instructor at the Surface Warfare Officers School, on the N5 at Commander, Naval Forces Korea, and in OPNAV N5, and is the Operations Officer for the Joint Staff J-7 Joint Deployment Training Center. He holds Masters’ degrees from the National War College and the University of Tulsa and completed his undergraduate work at Mary Washington College.

This article appears courtesy of CIMSEC and may be found in its original form here.