Op-Ed: Bamako Convention Cuts Africa Out of the Ship Recycling Industry

 

As the global commercial fleet approaches the end of its operational life, demand for ship-recycling capacity is projected to triple over the next decade. This surge will be driven by accelerated decarbonization efforts and the retirement of large numbers of aging tankers and bulk carriers. At present, South Asia accounts for 80–90% of global ship-recycling activity, with Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan operating the world’s dominant dismantling yards.

If global demand rises as forecast, existing centers will not be able to meet it alone. The industry will require new regions of operation, diversified infrastructure, and expanded labor forces. Because ship recycling is inherently labor-intensive, many developing countries—and African states in particular—are strongly positioned to benefit from this emerging economic opportunity.

However, Africa risks being unable to capitalize on this demand due to constraints created by the Bamako Convention, one of the continent’s most important environmental treaties.

Ship-recycling facilities cannot operate without a predictable and continuous supply of end-of-life vessels. Such volume is essential for achieving economies of scale, retaining skilled labor, ensuring safety standards, and remaining globally competitive. Yet this requirement directly conflicts with the Bamako Convention’s strict prohibition on the import of hazardous waste from non-Contracting Parties.

Under Article 4(1), Parties must adopt legal and administrative measures “to prohibit the import of all hazardous wastes, for any reason, into Africa.” Any such import is deemed illegal and a criminal act, and the ban applies not only on land but throughout the territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelf.

For policymakers, this presents a strategic challenge: how to reconcile legitimate environmental protections with the continent’s potential to participate in, and benefit from, a rapidly expanding global industry. Addressing this gap will require careful policy design, regional coordination, and legal innovation to ensure that Africa is not excluded from a transformative economic opportunity.

For end-of-life ships, this poses an immediate problem. Under prevailing legal interpretation in both Basel and IMO circles, a ship that is intended for dismantling and contains hazardous materials—such as asbestos, PCB-containing equipment, sludge oils or heavy-metal residues—is considered hazardous waste. As a result, importing such vessels into an African state that is Party to Bamako is prohibited outright. The ability of African states to build large-scale, internationally competitive recycling yards is therefore obstructed at the most fundamental level: they cannot legally import the ships they would need to dismantle.

The Convention also requires Parties to prohibit the export of hazardous waste to any state that has banned such imports. Although this obliges non-African exporters to respect Africa’s prohibitions, Bamako diverges from the Basel Convention in important ways. The Basel Convention—the global treaty governing hazardous-waste trade—relies on a “prior informed consent” (PIC) mechanism. Under Basel, a transboundary movement can only occur once the state of import has been notified and has given explicit written consent. Basel therefore regulates movement, but does not impose an absolute import ban.

Bamako, by contrast, adopts an outright ban on imports from non-Parties and applies PIC requirements primarily within Africa, not for imports from outside the continent. As comparative scholarship consistently notes, “the Bamako Convention adopts prior informed consent only within Africa.” The legal distinction is crucial: where Basel provides a conditional pathway for hazardous-waste imports, Bamako closes the door entirely.

This leaves African ship-recycling in a uniquely disadvantaged position. If a vessel destined for dismantling is classified as hazardous waste—and in most cases it will be—then a Bamako Party cannot legally import it. As a result, African yards cannot accumulate the volume of vessels required to scale operations or attract the investment needed to compete with South Asian facilities. In contrast, Bangladesh, India and Pakistan face no such regional treaty prohibitions and therefore continue to enjoy unrestricted access to ship-import flows, reinforcing their global dominance.

This structural disadvantage persists even when Africa receives international technical assistance. Through mechanisms such as the IMO’s Integrated Technical Co-operation Programme, several African coastal states are in the process or have received training, yard-design support and compliance assistance to prepare for HKC implementation. But technical capacity cannot overcome the legal barrier: a yard may be HKC-ready, but it cannot function without feedstock. And the recently issued voluntary IMO guidelines—Circular HKSRC.2/Circ.1 (1 November 2024)—which attempts to provide flexibility on the application of Basel and HKC, are non-binding and unlikely to alter the legal status of hazardous-waste shipments. Where voluntary guidelines conflict with binding treaty law, the latter prevails. Thus, infrastructure and training investments risk becoming symbolic rather than transformative.

The irony is that African states acted responsibly. Decades of hazardous-waste dumping in West and Central Africa made a strong treaty response necessary. Bamako is rightly regarded as one of the strictest environmental protection instruments in the world. But this protective framework now unintentionally excludes African states from a legitimate and potentially transformative industrial sector tied directly to the circular economy, green job creation and the decarbonization of maritime asset life cycles. If ship-recycling demand triples as projected, Africa’s inability to participate meaningfully will widen development gaps and reinforce existing geopolitical imbalances.

Even African states that have not ratified the Bamako Convention are not necessarily free to import end-of-life vessels. Many non-Parties have adopted domestic laws that replicate Bamako’s import ban, creating de facto restrictions. In addition, twenty-five African states have ratified the Basel Ban Amendment, which blocks the import of end-of-life ships from OECD countries, effectively eliminating this supply stream.

For the few African states that are not bound by Bamako or the Basel Ban and have no domestic prohibitions, another barrier remains: although almost all are Parties to the Basel Convention (except South Sudan), they generally lack the capacity to demonstrate the “environmentally sound management” required under Basel. Without proof of ESM capability, foreign exporters cannot legally send hazardous-waste vessels to them.

In short, across the continent, one of three barriers applies:

1. Bamako directly prohibits import,
2. Domestic law indirectly prohibits import, or
3. Basel compliance capacity is insufficient to allow import.

Under all three scenarios, Africa remains effectively excluded from the import-driven ship-recycling model that dominates the global market.

Geography further compounds this legal disadvantage. South Asian recycling hubs—such as Chittagong in Bangladesh and Alang in India—benefit from unique coastal topography. Their long, gently sloping tidal flats allow for low-cost beaching of large vessels, enabling dismantling without expensive dry-dock infrastructure. Many African coastlines, by contrast, have deeper waters, rocky substrates or ecologically sensitive zones. To match South Asia’s cost structure, African states would need to build capital-intensive slipways, dry docks or engineered containment systems. Combined with legal constraints, these geographic realities make Africa even less competitive.

If global demand for ship recycling truly triples within the next decade, Africa risks being left behind—not through lack of ambition or capacity, but because the legal and geographic architecture governing hazardous-waste movement leaves the continent structurally unable to participate. The Bamako Convention remains essential in its protective function, but its unintended industrial consequences are now impossible to ignore. Unless policymakers confront this widening gap between legal obligations and economic opportunity, Africa will remain a spectator as the world’s aging shipping fleet is dismantled elsewhere. The opportunity cost is immense.

The path forward requires legal reform, controlled import channels under HKC-compliant standards, strengthened hazardous-waste management capacity and a realistic alignment of maritime-industry development with treaty constraints. Only then can Africa transform its precautionary stance into a competitive advantage and reshape ship-recycling from a missed opportunity into a strategic industrial sector for the future.

Author’s Biography: Dr. Ishtiaque Ahmed is a Professor and Chair of the Department of Law at North South University, Bangladesh. A former Merchant Marine Engineering Officer, he holds a Doctor of the Science of Law (J.S.D.) from the University of Maine School of Law, USA, where he specialized in International Ship recycling laws and policy. He contributed to the drafting of Bangladesh’s Ship Recycling Rule 2025 (proposed) and revising Bangladesh Ship Recycling Act 2018 as the sole Legal Consultant. Dr. Ahmed is also a qualified Barrister of England, an active member of Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (MCIArb) in London and an Advocate in Bangladesh Supreme Court. His expertise lies at the intersection of maritime law, environmental regulation, and sustainable ship recycling practices. He can be reached at [email protected].