Hormuz Route Negotiations Would Have Handed Substantial Control to Iran

The entrances to the channel were to be in the waters of Iran, giving Iran a veto on passage - and the U.S. appeared ready to agree.

An IRGC minelaying boat in years past (IRGC)

Several different developments taking place in recent days indicate that diplomacy and negotiation are not going to bring warfare in the Gulf to an end anytime soon, either in the conflict involving Iran and nor in Yemen. For the maritime community, the scene appears set for a continuation and a worsening of the current pattern of naval action, blockades and of attacks on civilian shipping.

This week, the long-running negotiation between Iran and Oman came to a head, with GCC countries unwilling to accept the compromise which Iran and Oman had agreed. When the terms were understood, it appears a set of concessions had been made to Iran which thoroughly compromised the established UNCLOS arrangements governing the Strait of Hormuz itself, but also international standards pertaining to innocent passage through narrows and territorial waters.

Under the new arrangements, while the single new channel through the Strait was to pass through both Iranian and Omani territorial waters, the entrances to the channel at both ends were to be in the waters of Iran, giving Iran a veto over who should pass. Oman also appears to have surrendered the right to allow use of its own territorial waters for innocent passage.

What is particularly shocking is that the United States was kept abreast of the negotiations and appears to have been ready to agree these arrangements. Unsurprisingly, the remaining GCC states were unwilling to countenance even discussion of such a plan, which would have compromised their ability to trade, export and choose their own security partners, as well as leaving intact Iran’s threatening drone and missile capability and its program of regional expansionism.

In effect, the agreement was to have been an endorsement of Iran’s seizure of political suzerainty over the Gulf, as was evident in a description in Mehr News the preceding day of how Iran thought the conference was going to go in Salalah – the GCC representatives were to be ‘informed of the new arrangements’ as a fait accompli, denied an opportunity to discuss or object, and their presence would be advertised to the international community as being ‘tacit non-objection’ to the arrangements. It would have been akin to a surrender ceremony. Having walked away from the Salalah conference, the Gulf States now know that if they want to protect their own national sovereignty, they are going to have to fight for it.

In Yemen, the GCC countries have also understood that the Houthi undertaking offered to President Trump not to attack American interests was a means of putting off US intervention – at least until the Houthis had consolidated their military objectives, by which time they would have been in a stronger position to resist any American military counter-move. This cynical stratagem, using the offer of negotiation and diplomacy as a means of neutralizing a rescue intervention, while pressing on undisturbed with their own military action, could have been a ploy the Houthis learnt from 1938 and 1939. Here too the GCC countries have learned that if they want to defend their interests they will need to learn to fight on their own to do so.

The Iranians have always been skilled at the art of negotiation, and at using the deceptive practice of taqiyya. They have also taught their Houthi allies well. Invariably the Iranians concede very little during a negotiation while making a great play of doing so. Rarely do they follow through with promises or undertakings made. But at the same time they extract concessions from the other side, which is usually unwilling to fight as hard as the Iranians would for vital interests.

Reports carried by Axios quoting Israeli sources suggest that CENTCOM held a conference last week in Germany, most likely at the US airbase in Rammstein, to which the Chiefs of Staff of all the GCC states (less Oman), plus Egypt and Jordan, were invited. At the conference, the commander of CENTCOM apparently assured attendees that the United States would not withdraw militarily from the region and would expand safe passage for ships through the Strait of Hormuz. This was in other words an encouragement to carry on resisting.

The presence at the conference of the Israeli Chief of Staff Lt Gen Eyal Zamir may have been to offer short-term practical support, but he will certainly have explained that Israel has red lines which if crossed will trigger Israeli intervention. Many of these red lines concur with GCC interests, and this will also have reassured many in his audience.

Many involved in the Gulf conflict have hoped that negotiation will lead to a solution without further hostilities. Recent events suggest this is a false hope, albeit one which Iran has sought to exploit. In the short term therefore, there is little prospect of a ceasefire leading to a negotiated settlement.

In the meantime, Iran is suffering a desperate shortage of the funds it needs to keep a grip on power at home, a consequence of the 100%-effective US naval blockade. Iran will seek to wriggle free of the blockade by increasing its attacks on shipping, on US regional bases and on GCC infrastructure. But while the US Navy can maintain its blockade with little risk of casualties, for Iran a lifting of that blockade becomes more and more urgent: the IRGC needs the means to pay for the loyalty of its core supporters and the subsidies that keep down popular unrest.

The opinions expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of The Maritime Executive.