Op-Ed: It's Time to Invite Taiwan to America's Biggest Naval Exercise

 

[By Jim Halsell]

The Taiwan Strait remains one of the most volatile flashpoints in the world. With the People’s Republic of China (PRC) accelerating its coercive behavior aimed at “reunifying” Taiwan with the mainland, the United States must adopt a clearer, more deliberate strategy to bolster deterrence and reassure regional partners. One measure that should be taken is to include Taiwan in the world’s largest multinational maritime exercise – the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC). Doing so would be consistent with U.S. policy under the Taiwan Relations Act, align with the values of collective defense and democratic solidarity, and signal to Beijing that any use of military force against Taiwan will result in a unified, multinational response.

Taiwan’s Strategic Significance

Taiwan occupies a central position in the First Island Chain and plays a crucial role in the balance of power in East Asia. It is a thriving democratic society of 23.4 million people and a key node in global semiconductor supply chains. Beijing’s claim to the island is tenuous, supported by a campaign of intimidation and “gray zone” tactics that aim to coerce Taiwan into capitulation without war.

Though lacking official recognition as an independent country by the United States and many of its allies, Taiwan is not isolated. U.S. policy, as codified in the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), commits the United States to make available “defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability,” and to “maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security” of the people of Taiwan. Inclusion in RIMPAC would help operationalize this policy while remaining consistent with the U.S. One China policy.

Why Include Taiwan?

Deterrence requires both capability and credibility. While Taiwan continues to acquire U.S. military hardware and reform its defense posture, the question of whether the United States and its allies would support Taiwan in a contingency remains deliberately ambiguous. Strategic ambiguity may help manage escalation risk, but it risks failing to deter if Beijing concludes that the costs of aggression are tolerable.

Involving Taiwan in RIMPAC would signal a broader multinational investment in regional peace. Beijing is pursuing two parallel lines of effort to pressure Taiwan: coercion without violence and the looming threat of military force. Both avenues can be countered through stronger integration with partners, transparent signaling, and public commitments to Taiwan’s survival as a free society.

The inclusion of Taiwan in RIMPAC would not require diplomatic recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign state. RIMPAC has previously included diverse participants with some participating only as observers. Taiwan could be invited under a similar framework—e.g., “Taipei Navy—Observer”—that would align with RIMPAC precedent, and would not constitute formal U.S. recognition. It would, however, reinforce the deterrent message that a conflict in the Taiwan Strait would not remain a bilateral issue between Washington and Beijing.

Reinforcing the Taiwan Relations Act

The TRA provides a clear legislative foundation for actions that enhance Taiwan’s defense and deter coercion. The Act affirms that “the United States will consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means…a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” Participation in exercises like RIMPAC would help Taiwan prepare for defense without crossing the line into formal alliance, thereby avoiding a breach of the One China policy.

Congress continues to reaffirm bipartisan support for Taiwan’s self-defense. The FY2025 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) includes provisions to strengthen military cooperation and enhance deterrence through initiatives like the Taiwan Security Cooperation Initiative. Including Taiwan in exercises alongside Japan, Australia, and other regional partners would be a natural extension of these legislative efforts.

Operational and Symbolic Value

Beyond signaling, there are tangible military benefits. Taiwan’s military operates U.S.-made systems and is transitioning toward an asymmetric defense model, emphasizing survivability and denial. Interoperability with U.S. and allied forces, especially in joint maritime operations, will be essential in any scenario short of or including conflict.

As the Council on Foreign Relations notes, “Taiwan likely doesn’t have the capabilities to defend against a Chinese attack without external support,” despite pledging nearly $20 billion in defense spending for 2025. Enhancing operational coordination before a crisis emerges is not only prudent, but operationally essential.

Symbolically, inclusion in RIMPAC would acknowledge the democratic values that Taiwan shares with other regional partners. This is particularly important as Taiwan remains diplomatically isolated, with only eleven countries maintaining official relations. Participation in multinational military activities would help offset this isolation without provoking conflict, provided it is managed diplomatically and clearly communicated.

Would Other Nations Support Taiwan’s Inclusion in RIMPAC?

One of the central concerns surrounding Taiwan’s potential inclusion in RIMPAC is whether key U.S. allies and regional partners would support such a move or whether they would balk at the political risk of antagonizing the People’s Republic of China. However, recent geopolitical trends suggest that support for Taiwan’s participation in multinational defense activities is quietly growing, particularly among Indo-Pacific democracies that share an interest in preserving regional stability and resisting Chinese coercion.

Japan is perhaps the most likely partner to welcome Taiwan’s inclusion. Tokyo has become increasingly vocal about the importance of Taiwan to Japan’s national security, with senior officials, including former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, stating that “a Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency.” Japan’s Self-Defense Forces have increased coordination with the U.S. military and have participated in bilateral and trilateral exercises that implicitly prepare for scenarios involving Taiwan. Given Japan’s growing anxiety over China’s assertiveness and its own constitutional reinterpretation on collective self-defense, Tokyo would likely support Taiwan’s inclusion in a multilateral setting like RIMPAC, especially if coordinated in advance with careful diplomatic messaging.

Australia has also strengthened its strategic alignment with the United States and Japan, particularly through the AUKUS agreement. Canberra has voiced concerns about China’s regional behavior and recently joined Washington in emphasizing the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. While Australia might be more cautious about formal diplomatic gestures, it is unlikely to oppose Taiwan’s participation in a non-sovereign capacity, especially if framed as a security-enhancing measure rather than a political endorsement.

Other Indo-Pacific states, such as India, Philippines, and Vietnam, have growing interests in counterbalancing Chinese maritime assertiveness. India has long advocated for a multipolar Asia and may view Taiwan’s inclusion as consistent with its own efforts to build regional coalitions. The Philippines, under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., has deepened security ties with the United States and allowed expanded access to military bases in response to PRC aggression in the South China Sea. Vietnam, while traditionally wary of foreign alignments, has clashed with China over maritime claims and may be open to Taiwan’s inclusion in an observer or limited functional role.

European states that have participated in recent RIMPAC iterations such as France, Germany, and the United Kingdom have also increasingly signaled concern over Taiwan’s security. They conducted transits of the Taiwan Strait, and their defense white papers mention the Indo-Pacific as a zone of strategic interest. While these countries may not be vocal advocates for Taiwan’s inclusion, they would be unlikely to withdraw or protest if the decision were led by the United States with appropriate multilateral coordination.

Ultimately, the determining factor may be how the invitation is framed. If Taiwan’s participation is defined not as a sovereign equal to other states but rather as a security partner or “participant entity,” other nations could find it diplomatically palatable. This would mirror Taiwan’s existing participation in multilateral forums such as the Olympics, the World Trade Organization and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, where it joins under the name “Chinese Taipei.”

RIMPAC’s Flexible Participation Model

RIMPAC’s long history as a multinational exercise underscores its diplomatic flexibility. Since its inception in 1971, RIMPAC has included a diverse array of participants, including states with varying degrees of political alignment with the United States, non-ally partners, and even, at times, strategic competitors. This precedent offers a viable pathway for Taiwan’s inclusion without triggering a fundamental break in U.S. policy or alienating key participants.

A notable example is the People’s Republic of China, which was invited to participate in RIMPAC in both 2014 and 2016. Despite growing tensions in the South China Sea and concerns about Chinese military transparency, the Obama administration included the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in an effort to promote professional military dialogue and reduce the risk of miscalculation. China sent surface combatants, auxiliary vessels, and observers to participate in non-combat aspects of the exercise. This inclusion was reversed in 2018 following the continued militarization of artificial features in the South China Sea, but the precedent remains: even states that do not share U.S. values or alliance structures have participated in RIMPAC under constrained formats.

Similarly, RIMPAC has welcomed non-allied or non-aligned states such as Vietnam, India, and Brunei, each of which participated in observer or limited operational capacities. These arrangements allowed for diplomatic inclusivity without compromising the exercise’s core focus on interoperability and security cooperation. India was first invited as an observer in the early 2000s before gradually expanding its participation, culminating in the deployment of naval assets by the 2010s. This incremental approach demonstrates RIMPAC’s capacity to accommodate partners with unique diplomatic statuses or sensitivities.

The American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), established under the Taiwan Relations Act as the vehicle for unofficial U.S.-Taiwan relations, could serve as the conduit for managing Taiwan’s RIMPAC participation. AIT-coordinated representation would allow the United States to maintain consistency with its One China policy while exercising its commitment to Taiwan’s self-defense.

Managing PRC Backlash

Inevitably, Beijing would likely respond harshly to Taiwan’s inclusion in RIMPAC, as it has to other perceived infringements on its sovereignty claims. Large-scale military drills, economic sanctions, diplomatic condemnation, and cyber operations are all part of the PRC’s well-established retaliation playbook. Yet the United States and its partners must resist the temptation to let their Taiwan policy be dictated by fears of PRC outrage. This reactive posture grants Beijing a de facto veto over democratic decision-making and emboldens further coercion.

China has escalated its pressure campaign on Taiwan even in the absence of provocations. Since the election of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) President Tsai Ing-wen in 2016, Beijing has employed what Richard Bush calls “coercion without violence,” a deliberate campaign to wear down Taiwan psychologically, politically, and economically without firing a shot.3 This has included near-daily air and naval incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ), cyberattacks on government agencies, diplomatic isolation, and targeted disinformation campaigns.

These actions have continued even as Taiwan’s leadership has treaded cautiously. President Tsai’s tenure was marked by efforts to maintain the cross-Strait status quo and avoid unilateral declarations of independence. Her successor, President Lai Ching-te, has pledged to do the same, calling for “dialogue instead of confrontation” in his 2024 inauguration address. Nevertheless, Beijing has continued to characterize Lai as a “separatist” and launched punitive military exercises following both his inauguration and Taiwan’s National Day celebrations.

This pattern reveals a key truth: Beijing’s escalatory behavior is not a response to specific actions by Taipei or Washington, but part of a long-term strategy to bring Taiwan under PRC control. As such, restraint has not yielded peace; resolve may. Integrating Taiwan into multinational military exercises like RIMPAC would impose reputational and strategic costs on Beijing’s aggression by signaling that Taiwan’s security is a shared interest among responsible stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific.

Conclusion

Ultimately, deterrence fails when adversaries perceive inaction as weakness. Taiwan’s participation in multinational exercises is not merely symbolic. It is a necessary step to ensure that coercion is met with collective resolve. The message to Beijing must be unmistakable: the democratic world will not stand by while one of its own is bullied into submission.

It is time for the United States and its Indo-Pacific allies to move from passive deterrence to active deterrence. The inclusion of Taiwan in RIMPAC would send an unmistakable message to Beijing: any aggression against Taiwan risks triggering a multilateral response from a network of regional powers united by shared values and interests. Including Taiwan in RIMPAC would fulfill the spirit of the Taiwan Relations Act, enhance deterrence, and stand as a visible affirmation of America’s commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific.

Lieutenant Commander James Halsell is a submarine warfare officer. His most recent assignment at sea was engineer officer on board the USS Topeka (SSN-754). He is the Federal Executive Fellow at the U.S. Naval Institute, and a doctoral student at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, researching the potential impact of deep-seabed mining on maritime sovereignty assertions.