Op-Ed: Iran’s Withdrawal Doesn’t Signal Abandonment of Houthis

Earlier this month, observers pointed out the lack of activity by Iran’s Nedaja along the Red Sea. The presence of two U.S. Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) across Bab al-Mandab is cited as possible reason behind Iran breaking its naval “continuous presence in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden area since 2008.” This unique absence also highlights the redeployment of Iranian spy vessels such as the Zagros, Behshad, Saviz and Behzad, which “have played an important role in the collection of intelligence and its dissemination to Iran’s Houthi allies.” 

This unique coincidence may have contributed to recent reports claiming Iran has abandoned Houthis. Recent events however show an East Africa footprint provides the Iran-Houthi alliance capabilities to retain threats along the Red Sea. 

In recent months, the build-up of Iranian assets across territory held by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) has come under scrutiny, particularly since SAF took control of Khartoum in March. While Nedaja vessels may have withdrawn from the Red Sea, Iranian vessels continue to call at Port Sudan from Bandar Abbas. Just as Iran has provided assistance to Yemen’s Houthis, Tehran has helped SAF build a series of tunnel bases and deployed modern air defense and radar systems. 

Iran has yet to provide such systems to Houthis, perhaps as consequence of the vulnerability to U.S. strikes authorized under Operation Prosperity Guardian, and now Operation Rough Rider. Whereas in Sudan, there is no authority to interfere in the ongoing armed conflict, which would risk a wider war among regional powers and China. 

Houthis have also followed in Iran’s footsteps and established themselves along Sudan’s Red Sea coast. Multiple priorities pushed Houthi expansion into East African territories like Sudan and Somalia. Houthi presence has established outposts that allowed mobility for their operatives and future leap-frog bases as an umbrella for a “network of resistance.” Shared interests with Iran advanced the Houthi footprint across East Africa with help from well-established smuggling networks during the Saleh (d.2017) era, offering services to all parties. 

Iran’s own interests in East Africa absolutely center in countering growing influence of Gulf rivals like Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Sudan’s shores grant both allies direct access to Yanbu, a major port for gas and oil export that allow Saudi Arabia to bypass the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab en route to Suez Canal. Houthi drone capabilities, both aerial and sea-based, now have alternative launch points from Sudan capable of protecting their rear in event of a foreign invasion by sea and retain capability to threaten international naval presence across Bab al-Mandab.   

The US administration launched Operation Rough Rider specifically citing Houthi threats to maritime navigation along the Red Sea. Although Houthis have not targeted vessels since December 6, 2024, the month-long U.S. air campaign has reportedly degraded Houthi capability to launch drone or missile strikes against civilian ships across the Bab al-Mandab area. 

The Houthi-Iran alliance however can undoubtedly pose a similar threat from across Sudan’s Red Sea coast, targeting any naval forces providing support to ground troops moving toward Hodeida seaport. U.S. awareness of the threat from Sudan’s shore may also explain the use of Diego Garcia base for B2 bombers and position of U.S. naval forces farther north from Port Sudan and around Gulf of Aden. 

Fernando Carvajal served on the UN Security Council Panel of Experts on Yemen from April 2017 to March 2019 as a regional and armed groups expert. He holds an MA in National Security Studies and has over 20 years of experience conducting fieldwork in Yemen and the Gulf.