GAO Weighs in on Maritime Security
Vessel Tracking Systems Provide Key Information, but the Need for Duplicate Data Should Be Reviewed
GAO has released its (March 2009) report Maritime Security: Vessel Tracking Systems Provide Key Information, but the Need for Duplicate Data Should be Reviewed (GAO-09-337). This is a public version of a classified March report. The report was done at the request of the House Committee on Homeland Security and examines Coast Guard programs to improve maritime domain awareness by tracking vessels far offshore, in coastal areas, and in ports. Systems are generally in place for tracking larger vessels far offshore and in coastal areas, but vessel operators can turn off some of the systems and effectively disappear from view.
However, the bigger challenge continues to be tracking small vessels. The report highlights the small vessel threat. Terrorist have shown that they have the capability to use explosives-laden suicide boats as weapons, and such a capability could be used to attack other vessels, port facilities, or offshore platforms. While specific examples of such incidents are not the focus of the report, terrorist have used small vessels in the attacks on the American warship USS Cole, the Al Basrah and Khawr Al Amaya oil platforms in Iraq, the French oil tanker Limburg, and against several targets in Mumbai, India. Most recently, pirates from Somalia have effectively used small vessels to attack many larger vessels, hijack them, and hold them for ransom.
Current U.S. and international laws and regulations related to vessel tracking generally do not apply to smaller vessels, which include commercial fishing boats and recreational boats. Thus, current vessel tracking systems in place generally can not track these small vessels.
The AIS and LRIT tracking systems are of little use for most small vessels because such boats are not required to have transponders. The radar and video camera tracking systems (available in some ports) can help track small vessels, but they also face technical limitations. For examples, radar has difficulty detecting small vessels, especially in rough seas. Video cameras may not cover all port areas or may not work in bad weather or at night. Given the number of potential threats in a port, and the short time in which to respond to a threat, thwarting an attack by a small vessel may prove challenging even with systems in place to track small vessels. GAO found that studies and port stakeholders are in widespread agreement that detecting threatening activities by small vessels is very difficult without prior knowledge that an attack has been planned.
In addition, the report provides details on the status of Coast Guard’s various tracking systems, to include LRIT, AIS and local tracking systems like radars and video cameras. It also describes some of the international obligations the Coast Guard has taken on to operate LRIT as an international system, although several countries are still not ready to participate. There are appendices on LRIT and AIS that provide more detailed information not covered in the body of the report. One of the report’s conclusions, as indicated in the title, is that long-range AIS and LRIT, when combined with other sources, provide duplicate information. GAO had found that the Coast Guard had developed and procured these two systems separately. GAO did not find any evidence that the Coast Guard had gone through a deliberative process to identify requirements and determine the optimal assets or asset mix to meet them. Such duplication indicates the potential for inefficiency and waste. GAO recommends that the Coast Guard determine the extent to which duplicate information is needed to accomplish Coast Guard missions, particularly in light of information already available through national technical means. As usual, the back of the report includes an updated list of GAO related reports on maritime security issues.
•Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. ports, waterways, and coastal approaches are part of a system handling more than $700 billion in merchandise annually. With the many possible threats—including transportation and detonation of weapons of mass destruction, suicide attacks against vessels, and others—in the maritime domain, awareness of such threats could give the Coast Guard advance notice to help detect, deter, interdict, and defeat them and protect the U.S. homeland and economy. GAO was asked to review the Coast Guard’s efforts to achieve awareness about activity in the maritime domain. This report addresses: the extent to which the Coast Guard (1) has vessel tracking systems in place, (2) can use these systems to track vessels that may be threats, and (3) has coordinated the development and implementation of these systems. To answer these questions, GAO analyzed relevant statutes, regulations, and plans for vessel tracking systems, compared the roles of the planned systems, and interviewed appropriate officials.
•What GAO Recommends:
To ensure efficient use of resources, GAO recommends that the Commandant of the Coast Guard determine the extent to which duplicate vessel tracking information from LRIT and commercially provided long-range AIS is needed to accomplish Coast Guard missions, particularly in light of information already available through national technical means. DHS agreed with this recommendation.
•GAO Contact:
Stephen L. Caldwell / Director, Maritime Security Issues
Homeland Security and Justice Team / U.S. Government Accountability Office
(202) 512-9610