MarEx OP-ED: Shipboard Security and Vessel Defense

OP-ED By Captain Jeffrey L. Kuhlman There are as many eyes focused on the problem of shipboard security and vessel defense as there are proposed solutions. Those interested in the problem typically have their minds set on specific models: Somalian piracy or maritime terrorism (the Cole incident). Relatively few consider the entire problem, which also includes civil unrest and civil threats. Advocates of maritime security efforts are intelligent people with the “greater good” in mind, but they often lose sight of the larger picture and pigeon-hole their views. Fixation on Somalia International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reports indicate that regional piracy in the Malacca Strait, Singapore Strait and South China Sea, as well as Somalia, is becoming more active. Yet the public remains riveted on Somalia alone. According to a recent report, two armed attacks took place off Nigeria and two more in the South China Sea. The 15 July 2009 report from the IMB states that piracy, worldwide, more than doubled during the first six months of 2009. Looking at methods for defense against piracy, too much attention is paid to the Somali model. Somali pirates use a different modus operandi than most pirates elsewhere. The Somalis prefer daylight, while most others prefer night. Somalis prefer light-colored vessels, while dark colors are common elsewhere. Somalis use mother ships, while most other attackers do not. We can accept this one-dimensional view from the news media and politicians, but we professionals must keep a broader perspective. When we talk of counterterrorism at sea, we hear about the USS Cole and the Achille Lauro. Both of these attacks resulted in the loss of innocent lives at the hands of extremists. However, the lessons learned, though many, are not all-encompassing. A devastating threat potential lies in the use of a captured vessel as a weapons-delivery system. As evidence of this, we cite the boarding of a VLCC, in which the attackers took the ship’s plans and wanted information on handling the vessel at sea but had no interest in docking it. They then left the ship otherwise untouched. Does this sound at all like flight lessons in Florida prior to 9/11? What would the result of such an attack be? In 1947 a nitrate-loaded ship exploded near Texas City, Texas. The explosion sank other vessels and completely demolished the harbor area, killing thousands. During World War II, in both Halifax and Vancouver, ammunition ships exploded, killing thousands. What would happen today if a terrorist controlled LNG carrier sailed into Boston harbor? Think of a bio-agent or chemical agent dumped or spread by aerosol from a captured vessel in New York harbor. If you think this cannot happen, recall just a couple of months ago when a vessel with a Russian crew of 15 was captured in the Baltic Sea and sailed undetected through the English Channel. She could have entered any number of key ports or commercial centers. Ships travel globally and must maintain security always and everywhere, even if a coastal state fails to do so. When rioters descend upon a harbor area, ships in the harbor must remain secure. The ISPS Code directs that three threat levels are available to meet the security needs of the maritime industry. Within this structure, the ship’s Master and the Port Facility Security Officer must agree upon the security level to be observed and who is to provide what security. Consider, however, the possibility that the Port Facility Security Officer may be incapable of meeting his obligations or may be dead as a result of being involved in a coup. What happens then? These risks from civil unrest are seldom discussed and virtually never effectively addressed. Hypothetically, a vessel six hours out of port may receive a communication that there is a bomb planted aboard by an irate stevedore. The ship’s crew must deal with this. One could say, “Muster the crew in a safe place,” but where is that safe place? Similarly, all vessels are supposed to search for stowaways prior to leaving port. Stowaways stow away for a reason. They can be extremely dangerous, even deadly. Towards a Solution Vessel security has seldom gotten more than rhetorical attention, and there is little true training or even the desire to elevate ship security and vessel defense to levels needed in today’s world. However, the IMO recently issued a circular, MSC.1/Circ 1334, which expresses, in ANNEX sections 19 and 21, the need for crew training and the training of law enforcement personnel assigned to marine duties aboard commercial vessels. The circular mentions only antipiracy needs and ignores the other threat areas. In the U.S., Congressman Frank LoBiondo (R-NJ) has authored a Bill (HR 3376, The United States Mariner an Vessel Protection Act of 2009) requiring the training of crews and protection from liability of mariners who injure or kill an attacker in self-defense. These efforts reflect the mindset we need to resolve the real-world needs of shipboard security and vessel defense. We must consider all potential threats and train for them. Once this is done, we must equip and support our vessels accordingly. This is not an American problem. This is a global problem. To address it properly, international agreements should ensure that countries be mutually supportive of one another in their training and response programs. Capt. Jeffrey L. Kuhlman, who currently works in Africa, is the originator of the Castle Shipboard Security Program in association with the Sig Sauer Academy. He has multiple degrees in business and education and extensive military and maritime training and experience. Member: USSA, IASCP, SSCA, and NRA.