A Report Card on DHS Security Policies, Standards and Programs
Part 2 of 5: a look at CBP’s Container Management Standard; and CSI and The 24-hours Manifest. By Dr. Jim Giermanski, Chairman of Powers Global Holdings, Inc. and President of Powers International, LLC, an international transportation security company.
– Jason P. Ahern, Acting Commissioner, Customs and Border Protection
Although the introductory quotation of J. Ahern represents just one issue of this country’s treatment of container security, it is based on the standards against which Ahern and others in DHS form their conclusions. It is not the issue of only standards that influence their decisions, laws and policies are equally important. In the case of container security, Ahern’s statement demonstrates the lack of knowledge of container and cargo security technology and practice that relates directly back to standards established by DHS. If one looks seriously at the claimed standards of technology and/or practices of Congress, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in the global container and cargo security arena, it becomes obvious that the standards and practices to which they adhere are either unsupportable scientifically, or practically, or at best, weak in light of standards in the rest of the world. Of course, this is easy to say. Therefore, to be reasonable, honest, and convincing, it is necessary to treat with specificity examples of laws, standards, programs or practices of Congress, CBP or DHS. My analysis will examine only eight standards or criteria against which security decisions are made:
• CBP’s False Positive Standard;
• Legislation on 100% Scanning;
• CBP’s Container Management Standard;
• CSI and The 24-hours Manifest;
• Sealed-Door Standard;
• RFID Standard;
• In-bonds standard; and the
• Science and Technology Directorate CSD standard.
3. CBP’s Container Management Standard
This standard is perhaps the most difficult to recognize since it seems to be simply compliance with Federal Law. If the law says to do something, DHS and/or CBP attempts to do so. The U.S. has numerous programs, some codified in law, that form what some might call the management standard. Specifically, the U.S. has C-TPAT (Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism), CSI (Container Security Initiative), the 10 Plus 2 program, and now from TSA (Transportation Security Administration), the Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP). However, an amalgam of disparate programs and models do not constitute a standard. The rest of the world has developed a standard to secure international trade, ISO 28000. ISO is the International Standards Organization.
ISO (International Organization for Standardization) is the world's largest developer and publisher of International Standards…a network of the national standards institutes of 161 countries, one member per country, with a Central Secretariat in Geneva, Switzerland, that coordinates the system. ISO is a non-governmental organization that forms a bridge between the public and private sectors. Therefore, ISO enables a consensus to be reached on solutions that meet both the requirements of business and the broader needs of society.
Some of the international security programs like the U.S.’ C-TPAT and CCSP, the EU’s AEO, Canada’s PIP (Partners in Protection), Jordan’s GLP (Golden List Program), and New Zealand’s SES (Secure Export Scheme) are examples of government programs, different, but generally consistent with the WCO (World Customs Organization) framework of standards. The World Customs Organization released its Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade. Section 1-2-4 of Standards pronounced that supply chain security begins at stuffing (loading) the container and ends at unloading the container at destination. Appendix 1 to Annex 1 of the Standards is more specific by spelling out that continuous control from stuffing, through intermediate handling, loading on a carrier, off loading, terminal security, and unloading at destination are essential. Finally, the Standards require the electronic transmission of trade data and the use of Edifact and XML as EDI protocols. Also in 2005, the United States adopted the WCO Standards, joining other Customs Administrations around the world who are members of the WCO and who believe that security begins at origin and ends at destination, managed with electronic documentation and communication.
All represent, although unique in certain ways, some level of standardization of global cargo and container security. Yet, other than ISO 28000 there is no single standard, and government programs vary. The European Union is attempting to develop a container security management system even though the EU has the AEO program. The EU’s research program is entitled the Seventh Framework Programme (FP7). The FP7 is an EU-level program of the European Commission designed to bundle all research-related EU initiatives together under a common roof, playing a crucial role in reaching the goals of growth, competitiveness and employment through research involving global door-to-door container transport management, using ubiquitous track & trace technologies. The research will be done by the Smart Container Supply Chain Management (SMART-CM) Consortium. Its purpose to develop a service platform capable of:
1. A single window approach, to achieve interoperability of Container Security Technologies;
2. Handling of events within the container transport chain, to enable minimization of processes’ duration & cost and improvement of chain planning;
3. Continuous control of containers, to accomplish high level chain security;
4. Efficient exchange of information among the industrial actors and between industry and the customs authorities, based on authorization policies, to increase supply chain visibility; and
5. Working with existing initiatives such as that of AEO the U.S. Green Lanes implementation, to achieve faster throughput in transport corridors.
It should be noted that the U.S. has not been invited to participate, nor has interest been shown by the United States in participating. Thus, the United States really follows no global or single U.S. cargo or container security standard, and its security programs have obvious gaps in them. For instance, while international standards and models of cargo security embodied in ISO 28000 and the WCO Standards hold that security begins at origin and ends at destination with equal concern placed on outbound and inbound containers, DHS models only look at inbound containers. Inbounds-only is shorted sighted and dangerous. In effect, it portends a “no risk” condition with respect to outbound containers. Other nations are doing more. South Korea is modeling its program after the EU’s Authorized Economic Operators program. China is emulating the EU’s traceability guidelines, in both international and domestic in-transit movement of containers. Mexico is considering the equivalent of a certified C-TPAT. One can see that, in fact, U.S. models are or will be significantly weak in comparison as these nations institute their models and standards.
4. CSI and The 24-hours Manifest
The Container Security Initiative or CSI (now codified by the U.S. SAFE Port Act) is a variation of the security programs like C-TPAT, or AEO. It is as weak as the false/positive standard used by CBP. Its weakness is in its core component: the 24-hour manifest. A manifest is like a tally sheet of what the vessel is carrying. Except for visible cargo, the carrier has never known for sure what is in a locked and sealed container. This was recognized ever since we have had locked containers. The vessel carrier was forced to use honest terms like FAK (freight of all kinds) or STC (said to contain) which accurately explained that this or that was supposed to be in the container. The reality is no different today under the Container Security Initiative, except that the carrier cannot use those phrases. The carrier must put on the manifest what the shipper or his agent says the contents are. In essence, nothing has really changed. However, the purpose of the Container Security Initiative was to develop partnerships with foreign authorities to identify high-risk cargo containers originating at ports throughout the world before they are loaded on vessels destined for the United States. It is an information-based system that depends on the vessel carrier’s manifest to identify the cargo in a container that the vessel is carrying. CBP says "It is critically important that Customs officers receive this information as soon as possible in the process…U.S. Customs officers need timely and accurate manifest data and they need it now."
Unfortunately, the carrier makes and files the manifest and, consequently, is 100% dependent on the shipper (consignor) or the shipper’s freight forwarder for accurate information about contents. As such, the vessel carrier serves as a third party in verifying the contents of the container, the equivalent of hearsay.
Therefore, in CSI the details and accuracy of cargo information will always be linked to the person or firm that provides the cargo information to the carrier who actually completes the manifest. The carrier has no first-hand knowledge of the container’s contents. CSI's 24-hour rule places the responsibility of sending the manifest to CBP with the shipping line, specifically the liner that loads the container into the vessel at the foreign port for movement to the United States. The CBP mandate is that beginning in December 2002 carriers and/or automated NVOCC's (Non Vessel Operating Common Carrier) have to submit a cargo declaration 24 hours before cargo is laden aboard the vessel at a foreign port for any vessel beginning the voyage on or after Dec. 2, 2002. Originally, there were 14 types of data placed on the manifest; today there are 21.
While there are new data to report, nothing has really changed. For example, among the data are information such as numbers and quantities, commodity description and weight, and hazmat code. The carrier is still filing what the container is “Said to Contain.” Only now, instead of using the term “STC,” the carrier will use the harmonized tariff number of the products furnished by the shipper or his agent. We still don’t really know what is in the container.
NOTE: For a comprehensive treatment of the development of container security standards see: Dr. Jim Giermanski, The Development and Globalization of Container Security, Defense Transportation Journal, September 2008, Vol. 64, No. 5, pp 16-22.
NEXT WEEK – Part Three; CBP’s Sealed-Door Standard and the RFID Standard.
LAST WEEK – Part One; CBP’s False Positive Standard, and Legislation on 100% Scanning.
• About Dr. Giermanski:
Dr. Giermanski is the Chairman of Powers Global Holdings, Inc. and President of Powers International, LLC, an international transportation security company. He served as Regents Professor at Texas A&M International University, and as an adjunct graduate faculty member at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte. He was Director of Transportation and Logistics Studies, Center for the Study of Western Hemispheric Trade at Texas A&M International University.
Dr. Giermanski is co-inventor of a patent issued in the U.S. and in 32 other countries connected to transport container security. He is a recognized expert in global supply chain and container security by the World Bank and the World Customs Organization (WCO). He has frequently given invited testimony on NAFTA, transportation, and other international business issues before the U.S. Senate and House, the Texas Senate and House, EPA, and the U.S. International Trade Commission. He served as the co-chairman of the Texas Transportation Committee of the Task Force to prepare for NAFTA, sat for 5 years on the Texas Office of the Attorney General’s Trans-border Trucking International Working Group, and for three years as a member of the Research Advisory Committee on Management and Policy, Technical Advisory Panel, Texas Department of Transportation. He consults on international transportation and transportation security, border logistics, and trade matters involving Mexico, and has served as a border expert to assist the Arizona Department of Transportation in developing concepts and practices to improve the border crossing activities on the Arizona-Mexico border. And at the request of the White House, Council of Economic Advisors, he provided insight on trade issues and barriers on the southern border.
He has authored over 130 articles, books, and monographs with most focusing on container and supply chain security, international transportation and trade issues and for five years wrote the International Insight column in Logistics Management. He has appeared nationally as a special guest on the FOX News Channel’s Special Report with Brit Hume, CNN, NBC, CBS, NPR, BBC, Voice of America and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation in addition to many local and regional affiliates.
Finally, with his background as a former FBI special agent, OSI special agent and a Colonel in the Office of Special Investigations where he handled counterintelligence matters, He currently provides transportation security lectures on C-TPAT, and other Customs and Border Protection (CBP) programs.
Dr. Giermanski has a Masters degree from the University of North Carolina in Charlotte, a Masters from Florida International University, and a Doctorate from the University of Miami. He is a graduate of Air Command and Staff College, and The Air War College. And while serving as a visiting scholar at the Center of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education, (CADRE), an Air Force think tank, he wrote a book on the counterintelligence training of Air Force Office of Special Investigation Special Agents which was published by the Department of Defense.