A Report Card on DHS Security Policies, Standards and Programs
Part 5 of 5: Conclusion and Final Grades for all 8 performance categories. By Dr. Jim Giermanski, Chairman of Powers Global Holdings, Inc. and President of Powers International, LLC, an international transportation security company.
– Jason P. Ahern, Acting Commissioner, Customs and Border Protection
Although the introductory quotation of J. Ahern represents just one issue of this country’s treatment of container security, it is based on the standards against which Ahern and others in DHS form their conclusions. It is not the issue of only standards that influence their decisions, laws and policies are equally important. In the case of container security, Ahern’s statement demonstrates the lack of knowledge of container and cargo security technology and practice that relates directly back to standards established by DHS. If one looks seriously at the claimed standards of technology and/or practices of Congress, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in the global container and cargo security arena, it becomes obvious that the standards and practices to which they adhere are either unsupportable scientifically, or practically, or at best, weak in light of standards in the rest of the world. Of course, this is easy to say. Therefore, to be reasonable, honest, and convincing, it is necessary to treat with specificity examples of laws, standards, programs or practices of Congress, CBP or DHS. My analysis will examine only eight standards or criteria against which security decisions are made:
• CBP’s False Positive Standard;
• Legislation on 100% Scanning;
• CBP’s Container Management Standard;
• CSI and The 24-hours Manifest;
• Sealed-Door Standard;
• RFID Standard;
• In-bond standard; and the
• Science and Technology Directorate CSD standard.
Conclusion and Final Grade
1. CBP’s False Positive Standard: Grade - F
The 99% false positive standard is scientifically unsound given the environment of the global supply chain. Even medical science accepts less. For instance, if a man takes the prostate-specific antigen (PSA) test (which is not an absolute indicator of cancer), and if it indicated a need to look further, it would be reasonable to look inside to find out whether or not there is cancer. It just makes sense.
2. Legislation on 100% Scanning: Grade - F
Like the false positive standard, this model is unsound not only because of the worldwide and diverse treatment of containers in different ports and cultures, it does nothing to guarantee our security if a previously scanned container then goes through a transshipment port where a bomb, drugs, or gummy bears can be inserted prior to entry into the United States.
3. CBP’s Container Management Standard: Grade - C- or D
With respect to container security, the U.S. lags, not leads. The gradual adoption of the ISO 28000, the research and development in and by the European Union, and the outbound and inbound, door-to-door standard established by the AEO program clearly demonstrate the lack of adequacy of programs such as C-TPAT and the level of sophistication of CBP. Finally, this writer has demonstrated that an unknown shipper can send an outbound container through a major U.S. port without CBP knowledge of contents.
4. CSI and the 24-hr. Manifest: Grade - F
CSI’s 24-hr. manifest not only doesn’t tell us what is really in the container, it is filed by a 3rd party who takes the word of the shipper. While intended to improve security by having CBP personnel in foreign ports, it opens the door for other nations to have their Customs officials placed at our ports doing their thing! Finally, it is expensive to have our personnel there, especially in light of no linkage between them and what is actually leaving those ports in-route to the United States.
5. Sealed-Door Standard: Grade - F
Perhaps, the worst of all models is the seal-door standard. Suffice it to say that this writer has personally either accomplished or observed personally four ways of bypassing a sealed container without violating the integrity of the seal and without any manipulation of the hinges. In a public demonstration a sealed container was sent to private location where a philosophy professor and a housewife (trained for the purposes of the demonstration) surreptitiously breach a sealed container. It is shameful that DHS and CBP cannot or will not do better when systems that protect the entire container exist, and are affordable.
6. RFID Standard: Grade - F- (if that’s possible)
As evidenced with the withdrawal of one of the major RFID manufacturers from the market, and the departure of another manufacturer from certain major ports, and as evidenced by scientific demonstration, RFID not only does not work for global container security, it remains a recognized vulnerability to our port system as confirmed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
7. In-bond/In-Transit Policy: Grade - F
Similar to the 24-hour manifest, we really do not know what is in the in-bond containers moving through and around the United States. We do know only what is claimed to be in the container. CBP and DHS know we know because just as the Office of the Secretary of Defense confirmed the vulnerability posed by RFID, GAO confirmed the security weakness posed by DHS’ in-bond standard.
It’s easy to give a grade, hard to teach, and even harder to learn. The U.S. has simply been lucky, complemented by a little stupidity on the part of the terrorists. Container security systems exist today to fix all of these weaknesses. And in response to J. Ahern, there is proven technology to fix the transshipment problem. While other nations recognize this, CBP apparently does not. It’s time for CBP to remove its head from where it is and learn.
8. CSDs and S&T: Grade - F
Perhaps the easiest, and most enjoyable (although I shouldn’t enjoy it) “F” to give is the one to S&T. And they will spend $9.7 million dollars to earn it. In response to the question as to whether any of their CSDs have been deployed by the private sectors, in their own words: Not Yet !
LAST WEEK – Part 4; a look at CBP’s In-bond standard; and the Science and Technology Directorate CSD standard.
THIRD WEEK – Part Three; CBP’s Sealed-Door Standard and the RFID Standard.
SECOND WEEK – Part Two; CBP’s Container Management Standard; and CSI and The 24-hours Manifest.
FIRST WEEK – Part One; CBP’s False Positive Standard, and Legislation on 100% Scanning.
• About Dr. Giermanski:
Dr. Giermanski is the Chairman of Powers Global Holdings, Inc. and President of Powers International, LLC, an international transportation security company. He served as Regents Professor at Texas A&M International University, and as an adjunct graduate faculty member at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte. He was Director of Transportation and Logistics Studies, Center for the Study of Western Hemispheric Trade at Texas A&M International University.
Dr. Giermanski is co-inventor of a patent issued in the U.S. and in 32 other countries connected to transport container security. He is a recognized expert in global supply chain and container security by the World Bank and the World Customs Organization (WCO). He has frequently given invited testimony on NAFTA, transportation, and other international business issues before the U.S. Senate and House, the Texas Senate and House, EPA, and the U.S. International Trade Commission. He served as the co-chairman of the Texas Transportation Committee of the Task Force to prepare for NAFTA, sat for 5 years on the Texas Office of the Attorney General’s Trans-border Trucking International Working Group, and for three years as a member of the Research Advisory Committee on Management and Policy, Technical Advisory Panel, Texas Department of Transportation. He consults on international transportation and transportation security, border logistics, and trade matters involving Mexico, and has served as a border expert to assist the Arizona Department of Transportation in developing concepts and practices to improve the border crossing activities on the Arizona-Mexico border. And at the request of the White House, Council of Economic Advisors, he provided insight on trade issues and barriers on the southern border.
He has authored over 130 articles, books, and monographs with most focusing on container and supply chain security, international transportation and trade issues and for five years wrote the International Insight column in Logistics Management. He has appeared nationally as a special guest on the FOX News Channel’s Special Report with Brit Hume, CNN, NBC, CBS, NPR, BBC, Voice of America and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation in addition to many local and regional affiliates.
Finally, with his background as a former FBI special agent, OSI special agent and a Colonel in the Office of Special Investigations where he handled counterintelligence matters, He currently provides transportation security lectures on C-TPAT, and other Customs and Border Protection (CBP) programs.
Dr. Giermanski has a Masters degree from the University of North Carolina in Charlotte, a Masters from Florida International University, and a Doctorate from the University of Miami. He is a graduate of Air Command and Staff College, and The Air War College. And while serving as a visiting scholar at the Center of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education, (CADRE), an Air Force think tank, he wrote a book on the counterintelligence training of Air Force Office of Special Investigation Special Agents which was published by the Department of Defense.