MarEx Mailbag

This week’s Mailbag is full and references several articles in previous editions. Maritime education, the net effect of STCW, and MERPAC input to all of that was the subject of our 23 April editorial. We thought that the Maritime Education Summit and the quarterly MERPAC meeting which took place three weeks ago at the Massachusetts Maritime Academy in Buzzards Bay, MA brought to light some interesting points that MarEx readers would find of value. Indeed, the piece garnered heavy traffic from MarEx e-readers and brought in some letters, as well. I was surprised that some readers chose to focus on STCW impacts on the yacht business and mariners who toil there. Perhaps I should focus as much on all license categories as I tend to do on the so-called “blue water” mariners. Fair enough. You can read the 23 April editorial, entitled “The Last Straw” by clicking HERE. Below, the first letter references my response (click HERE to read it) to another reader’s take on STCW and its effect on yacht licensing:

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"I think it would help if you boiled that down to maybe two sentences. I'm interested, but just can't dig through 2000 words to find the message." That statement just about sums up the attitude of far too many yacht crew. They simply can't be bothered to spend the time or invest in the training needed to safely and economically operate a modern seagoing vessel. Many of those who enter the industry directly, as opposed to moving from the commercial shipping sector, believe that the existing training standards and curricula shouldn't apply to them since the tool they pick up most often is a cellphone. "As far as certification goes, to work on a yacht over 24 meters we need the same certificates as any ship." This, again, reflects a sad lack of understanding of the maritime licensing structure. The statement "over 24 meters it's all the same as any other vessel." Is a clear illustration of the ignorance so prevalent among yacht license holders. Thanks to the MCA's ill-advised decision to create a separate subclass of yacht-limited licenses a few years ago, we now have yachts up to 3000 tons under command of those with less sea time than that required to obtain an American AB or QMED endorsement. While the gentleman who doesn’t have time to read has found time to claim that his New Zealand license – which by the way only requires 6 months sea time with 4 months watchstanding, yet is the IMO equivalent of a USCG 2nd A/E license - is required to serve on a yacht over 24 meters, is being disingenuous at best. The manning requirements for virtually all foreign flag yachts are based on the UK MCA manning tables. These are a convoluted matrix of length, tonnage, horsepower, and distance offshore. A 24 meter vessel with less than 750 kW propulsion power operating within 60 miles of shore doesn't even require a licensed engineer. A deckhand who has completed a 5 day class at a storefront school may serve as "chief engineer." At the other end of the spectrum, to serve as chief engineer on a 100+ meter, 3000 ton, 6000kW "yacht" carrying 12 passengers for hire anywhere on the planet only requires 30 months "actually at sea" and a handful of 5 day classes. None of the time between first setting foot onboard a vessel and the highest yacht license level requires a single day of service in a subordinate position. There is no requirement for leadership training, or even to experience leadership first hand. There is no requirement at any stage for performance evaluation or oversight. All experience is ad-hoc, there is no mentoring system or means to identify the incompetent or weed out the unfit. The high salaries paid to yacht crews lead to a discouraging number of fraudulent certificates and outright fake sea time claims. "We all take the same STCW 95 and the same advanced firefighting etc. In many ways this is a bad thing as we train for a fire or emergency aboard a ship, then step onto a yacht where we have a new plan." How can one respond to a statement such as that? The frightening lack of comprehension demonstrated by this licensed officer on a commercial vessel carrying passengers - which is what a charter yacht really is – is profoundly disturbing. We need only look at a recent yacht casualty* to see the result of a very broken licensing system. It is beyond my understanding how the IMO allows this system to stand. As I wrote previously, if EU maritime officials want to ensure that marine officers hold adequate training and experience, they should begin the process a little closer to home. http://www.maib.gov.uk/publications/investigation_reports/2008/lady_candida.cfm Rick Boggs MarEx Editor’s Remarks: No comments needed, I think. Here’s another on STCW issues:

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Dear Mr. Keefe, I'm totally against any thought of eliminating Celestial Navigation from the curriculum of any nautical school or any Coast Guard test that presently requires it. If you follow the Science Channel at all you might know that the scientists are beginning to worry that the next high in the sun spot cycle scheduled for 2012 could be devastating in its strength and duration. (a Fox News clip concerning this: http://www.truveo.com/Sunspots-Affect-Our-Lives-Science-Daily/id/3962052311) If bad enough this sunspot cycle could wipe out satellites, TV, and the Internet for months. This could mean possibly going back to a totally non- electronic wheelhouse. (Of course most modern diesel engines can't run without a computer, so it might be a mute point.) Just imagine having to go back to wind up chronometers and parallel sailing! They'll be wheeling a lot of “old sea dogs” out of the nursing home just so they can find Europe or wherever! Sincerely, John O'Reilly MarEx Editor’s Remarks: The next few letters reference our 30 April editorial on Piracy (read it HERE.

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Hello Joe, Just finished your 30 April 09 op ed on piracy in Somalia waters. I admire your passion for seeking a solution, but why make a big deal out of what really is a simple solution? If the US Navy is not up to the task, then here’s the solution to end piracy off Somalia: 1. Find a large international security company that can train and man merchant ships. 2. Find a chief, a director to coordinate the operation, like a dispatcher to make sure ships have proper security before they transit the Somalia coast. 3. All ship owners of companies who want security and who regularly transit Somalia waters must ante up $500,000 each for initial start up costs for armed security. 4. Recommendation for salaries: $250 per day per man; $100 per day for misc. expenses; $500 bonus for each attack thwarted. 5. Place five armed men aboard each ship with proper weapons, night vision equipment, etc with the authority to shoot to kill. 6. These armed agents of shipboard security make a 45 day tour running back and forth, catching one ship in Aden and exiting in Egypt and vise versa. Back and forth they go and then relieved by another five armed agents of a new team while the old team goes home for 45 days. (You don’t want too much shift changing when bullets may fly and costs go up to fly them home.) 7. For every transit a ship owner makes thru the piratical waters, another $100,000 to the general pool to pay the security company providing the security agents. 8. With the object to “SHOOT TO KILL,” in time, the pirates will subside and vanish. The agents who actually kill and deter pirates get a bonus for saving the ship millions. If they die in the process, there is no recourse as they will sign their lives away for this insane job. But for the money, there are many who wouldn’t bat an eye. Joe, this is a relatively easy solution for like most problems in the world are, the implementation is where it gets tough. So get out there and do it. Sure, it takes a good organization like any good enterprise, some energy, and the will to succeed. You are a smart guy with the right connections and who better to make it happen and in the process, who knows, you could make a little history for yourself. Good luck, Captain Chase Pollman S/Y ISLAND TIME San Andres Island

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Joe: From June 1980 to June 1985, I was the second in command for all security throughout the U.S. Coast Guard. During that time I was assigned to a DOD working group that was set up to deal with similar attacks to what is happening off the coast of Africa today. We conducted a few classified exercises involving industry, state authorities, the USCG and DOD. We learned several lessons which the US government seems to have forgotten. While our group focused on attacks against the LOOP facility off Louisiana, what we did and what we learned can almost entirely be transferred to the piracy problem. We learned that the United States must take the lead and introduce a resolution in the UN allowing any authorized agent (including private enterprise) to use whatever force might be necessary to apprehend suspects and bring them to trial under the appropriate jurisdiction We learned that rapid and effective security response will never come from a government agency. We learned that effective training could be provided to crews to deter or repel an attack. Pious cries that training and arming crews might lead to more violent incidents will eventually lead to litigation from victims or their families. Piracy is a problem that must be dealt with effectively on both a government and private level in order to be solved. Seeking the government to shoulder all the responsibility will never be effective Sincerely, Robert Russo MarEx Editor’s Remarks: This appears to be experienced advice from a maritime security veteran. Certainly, it makes for interesting reading. And, one more on the same subject:

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To: Editor From: Captain Hugh Jardon RE: Piracy in the Gulf of Aden Dithering has reigned supreme on the issue of halting piracy in the Gulf of Aden. The solution that will work effectively, immediately, and in a cost-effective manner is putting armed personnel on board the ships as they transit the area. The primary issue of piracy is innocent ships’ crews being put into jeopardy. There is no better recipe for tragedy than excitable young men, poorly trained, and armed with automatic weapons, taking over a ship. Also, the disruption to commerce and the ensuing cost is enormous. The fleets of the world powers lack sufficient ships to patrol the pirate-infested Gulf of Aden. Arming the ships making the transit through the area, four well-trained and well-armed guards would be sufficient, is the answer. Rather than numerous warships, use already-trained soldiers and Marines. Modern weapons enable pirate ships to be engaged effectively at a range far beyond the reach of the pirate. Warning shots may be fired to protect the innocent and to discourage pirates. Should they persist, they should be killed. A few instances of harsh dealing should put an end to this intolerable situation. We have more bullets than Somalia has pirates. MarEx Editor's remarks: Captain Jardon is in the "let's get 'em armed" camp, I think. It does appear to be moving in that direction.